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Note
Collateral Estoppel of Claim Interpretation After
Markman
Rachel Marie Clark*
The interpretation of the claim language of a patent is a
complicated process that determines the protection a patentee
can expect to obtain.1 In Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that a district court
judge must, as a matter of law, construe the scope of a patent
::: J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S.Ch.E.,
University of Wisconsin 2000. The Author would like to thank David Gross
and Anthony Zeuli for their valuable comments and insight on earlier versions
of this Note; the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their
tireless efforts and exceptional editing; and especially my family, Jim,
Gretchen, Ramsey, and Ryan, and my fiance, Michael Hughey, for their love,
encouragement, and constant support.
1. Claim interpretation is the process of construing the meaning of the
language in a patent claim. See Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019,
1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997), amended on reh'g, 131 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
For example, consider the case of K-2 Corp. v. Salomon SA, 191 F.3d
1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999). K-2 owns a patent on in-line roller skates. Id. at 1359.
The patent claims an in-line skate with a soft, pliable inner shoe surrounded
by molded plastic straps fixed to the base of the skate. Id. The pertinent
language claims "an in-line roller skate having an upper shoe portion and a
lower frame portion... [and] a non-rigid shoe portion... being permanently
affixed to [the] base portion." Id. at 1360.
Salomon makes and sells in-line skates. Id. at 1361. K-2 sued Salomon
for infringement, alleging Salomon's "use of a removable screw in the heel
area" infringes on the "permanently affixed" limitation of the '466 patent. Id.
(quoting K-2 Corp. v. Salomon SA., 1998 WL 1032110 (W.D. Wash. 1998)). K-
2 argued that "permanently affixed" should be construed to mean "affixed,"
"secured," or "firmly held." Id. (quoting K-2 Corp., 1998 WL 1032110). The
court interpreted the meaning by looking at the claim and interpreting the
language as a person of ordinary skill in the art would have read it at the time
of invention. Id. at 1365. Construing the language according to its "ordinary
and accustomed meaning," the court held that the language 'permanently
affixed' requires that the connection between the bootie and the base of the
skate be unremovable." Id. Therefore, the language "permanently affixed"
does not encompass the removable screw used in the heel area of the TR skate,
and Salomon is not guilty of infringement. Id. at 1365-66. Claim
interpretation is discussed in more detail later in this Note.
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by interpreting the meaning of the claims.2 The Markman
Court noted that the importance of uniformity in the treatment
of patents necessarily required courts to determine issues of
claim interpretation.3 Because of the Markman decision, many
district courts now have a "Markman hearing" before the trial
in which the court interprets the claim language.4 Collateral
estoppel has acquired a unique significance after the Markman
decision because it is unclear whether one district court's claim
interpretation binds another district court.
Only recently, five years after Markman, have district
courts determined under what circumstances collateral
estoppel applies to an earlier claim interpretation. Only a few
district court decisions address the issue, and the decisions are
not uniform. Some courts hold that claim interpretation has a
special finality and that collateral estoppel should apply.5
Other courts review cases with nearly identical facts and refuse
to accord collateral estoppel effect to the claim interpretation. 6
The greatest disagreement is the application of collateral
estoppel to claim interpretation if the parties settle after the
2. 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
3. Id. at 391.
4. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.,
93 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the district court held a
hearing on claim interpretation and referring to it as a "Markman Hearing").
5. See, e.g., Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp.
2d 190, 195-96 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding that collateral estoppel applies to
claim interpretation); Abbott Labs. v. Dey L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667, 671-72
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (same); TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370,
376-77, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Sec. People, Inc. v. Medeco Sec. Locks,
Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1041, 1044-45 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (same), affd mem.,
243 F.3d 555 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Masco Corp. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 337,
341 (2001) (same); see also KX Indus., L.P. v. PUR Water Purification Prods.,
Inc., 108 F. Supp. 2d 380, 387 (D. Del. 2000) (noting a court's claim
construction in a prior suit did not collaterally estop an unrelated defendant
from obtaining a new claim construction, but deferring to the previous
construction of the claims under the doctrine of stare decisis).
6. See, e.g., Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d
464, 469-70 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding that collateral estoppel did not apply to
the claim interpretation); Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Intl, LLC, 77
F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (same); P.A.T., Co. v. Ultrak, Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 1518, 1521 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that the patentee was not
collaterally estopped by an earlier court's Markman hearing); see also Tex.
Instruments, Inc. v. Linear Tech. Corp., No. 2:01-CV-004-DF, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2331, at *26-27 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2002) (holding a court's claim
construction in a prior suit did not collaterally estop an unrelated defendant
from obtaining a new claim construction); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 80 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 924 n.4 (N.D. Ill.), modified, 130 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(same); infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
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claim interpretation but before trial, or if the patentee loses on
the claim interpretation but wins on infringement.7
The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, because it is
almost certain the Federal Circuit will visit this issue in the
near future, this Note attempts to provide guidance for the
Federal Circuit in its decision. Second, until the Federal
Circuit does determine the extent of the finality of claim
interpretation, this Note clarifies the present state of the law in
view of pre- and post-Markman precedent for the patent
litigator. Part I of this Note provides a basic overview of patent
law, claim interpretation, and collateral estoppel. Part II
examines pre- and post-Markman decisions on collateral
estoppel, focusing especially on the "essential to final
judgment" element of collateral estoppel. Part III argues that
there is not a special finality to claim interpretation if it is not
essential to the final judgment on infringement or validity.
Finally, Part IV proposes that the Federal Circuit clarify that
the claim interpretation must be essential to the final judgment
on infringement or validity for collateral estoppel to apply.
I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND CLAIM
INTERPRETATION
A. OVERVIEW OF PATENT LAW
A patent is an agreement between an inventor and the
federal government. The government grants a patentees the
exclusive right to exclude others from "making, using, offering
for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States
or importing the invention into the United States" for a term of
twenty years. 9 If the patent covers a process, the patentee has
the exclusive right to exclude others from "using, offering for
sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into
the United States, products made by that process."10 In return
for patent protection, the patentee fully discloses the invention
7. See infra notes 113-132, 144-157 and accompanying text.
8. An inventor is considered the "patentee." An inventor may assign her
rights to another, making that person the "assignee" or the owner of the
patent. Patentee and assignee are often used interchangeably. See, e.g.,r8
DONALD S. CHISUIM, CHISUMI ON PATENTS § 22.02 n.2 (2001). This Note will
use "patentee" to refer to the owner of the patent.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2000). The twenty years runs from the date
the patent application is filed. Id. § 154(a)(2).
10. Id. § 154(a)(1).
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to the public.ll After the term of years of the patent runs out,
the patent becomes a part of the public domain and anyone
may make use of it.12 The patent system encourages creativity
and innovation by providing an incentive to invent. 13 It also
furthers invention by allowing other inventors to utilize the
information within the public domain. 14
An inventor may obtain a patent after successfully
prosecuting a patent application before the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).15 For a patent to be
granted, the invention or process must meet certain statutory
requirements. It must be useful, 16 novel, 17 and nonobvious. 18
The invention must also fall within the bounds of patentable
subject matter.19 The specification of the patent application
must set out the best mode of the invention and be clear
enough to enable one skilled in the art to make or use the
invention.20 The claims of the invention must assert the
subject matter the inventor considers to be the invention.21
Once a patent application is filed, the patentee may file
further patent applications as continuations, continuations-in-
part, or divisional applications and still claim the priority date
of the original application as long as no new matter is
introduced.22 The granted patent consists of a summary of the
11. Id.
12. See In re Robeson, 331 F.2d 610, 614 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
13. See, e.g., Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998).
14. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369
(1938).
15. See HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 13-26 (2d ed.
1995) (explaining the prosecution process); Stephen G. Whiteside, Note,
Patents Claiming Genetically Engineered Inventions: A Few Thoughts on
Obtaining Broad Property Rights, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1019, 1020-25 (1996)
(describing the patent application process).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
17. Id. § 102.
18. Id. § 103.
19. Id. § 101.
20. Id. § 112.
21. Id.
22. 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2001). A continuation is a second (child)
application stemming from the original (parent) application. See 1 CHISUM,
supra note 8, § G1-4. A child and parent patent have the same specification,
though they claim different inventions. 1 id. A continuation-in-part is like a
continuation application, except that it adds some new matter. 1 id. § G1-5. If
two or more distinct inventions are claimed within a single patent application,
the PTO may require the patentee to restrict the patent to only one of the
inventions. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2000); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.141 (2001). The
[Vol.86:15811584
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invention, an abstract of the invention, a detailed description of
the invention, drawings if appropriate, a brief description of
any drawings, and the claims of the invention. 23
If another party allegedly utilizes the invention or process
without the patentee's permission, 24 the patentee may charge
that party with infringement of the patent.25 The infringement
analysis consists of two steps: (1) construing the patent claims
and (2) determining if the alleged product infringes. 26 Only the
specifically described claims of a patent may be infringed.27
Patent law is within the exclusive domain of the federal
courts. The Constitution and federal statutes govern patent
law.28 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (the Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction over
patent case appeals from district courts, 29  subject to
discretionary review by the Supreme Court.30 Congress created
the Federal Circuit to assure consistency, decrease the
workload of the circuit courts, and better utilize judicial
resources. 31 The Federal Circuit also has jurisdiction over
interlocutory orders for which it would have jurisdiction
originally,32 orders involving a controlling question of law for
which there is a substantial ground for a difference of opinion,33
other invention can still claim priority to the date of the original filing if it is
claimed in a divisional application. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2000).
23. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.71-.75 (2001).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
25. Id. § 281.
26. See Strattec Sec. Corp. v. Gen. Auto. Specialty Co., 126 F.3d 1411,
1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The first is a question to be determined by the court.
The second is a question of fact, to be submitted to a jury.") (citations omitted).
27. See Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications
Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that claims "define[ the scope
of the protected invention"); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721
F.2d 1540, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[Infringement must be decided with respect
to each asserted claim as a separate entity.").
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing creation of a national
patent system and empowering Congress to "promote the Progress of science
and useful Arts" by "securing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective ... Discoveries"); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2000).
30. Id. § 1254.
31. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-24 (1981); S. REP. No. 97-275, at'5
(1981).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c), (d) (2000). The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
over interlocutory orders granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or
dissolving injunctions. Id. § 1292(a)(1), (c)(1).
33. Id. § 1292(b), (c)(1).
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and judgments that are final except for the damages
calculation.34  To assure consistency, district courts are
required to follow Federal Circuit precedent on substantive
issues in patent cases.35
B. CLAIM INTERPRETATION
Until 1996, courts disputed whether claim interpretation
(also called claim construction) of a patent was an issue of fact
for the jury to decide, or an issue of law for the court to decide.
Some Federal Circuit opinions held that disputes concerning
the meaning of patent claims involved issues of fact.36 Other
Federal Circuit opinions held that claim construction was a
matter of law and therefore within the court's domain. 37 This
conflict was remedied in 1996. In Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., the United States Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision holding
that a district court judge must construe, as a matter of law,
the scope of a patent, including interpreting the meaning of the
claims.38 The Court reasoned that the policy of uniformity in
patent interpretation was the reason for creation of the Federal
Circuit.39 The Court noted that collateral estoppel 40 would
provide for uniformity in jury decisions, and concluded that
"treating interpretive issues as purely legal will promote
34. Id. § 1292(c)(2).
35. See Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 475 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding that, in the interest of consistency and to discourage forum shopping,
the Federal Circuit should adopt its own interpretation of a Supreme Court
decision as applied to the res judicata effect of a consent judgment with
respect to the issue of validity, and not direct the district court to follow
regional circuit interpretation).
36. See Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft,
m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Perini Am., Inc. v. Paper
Converting Mach. Co., 832 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1987); H.H. Robertson Co.
v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
37. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822-23 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
38. 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). For a general discussion of claim
interpretation, the right to a jury trial, and the policy concerns behind
Markman, see 5 CHISUM, supra note 8, § 18.01-.06.
39. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
40. Collateral estoppel is "[an affirmative defense barring a party from
relitigating an issue determined against that party in an earlier action, even if
the second action differs significantly from the first one." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 256 (7th ed. 1999). Collateral estoppel will be discussed in great
detail in the remainder of this Note.
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(though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty
through the application of stare decisis on those questions not
yet subject to intexjurisdictional uniformity under the authority
of the single appeals court."41
Judges have broad discretion over when to interpret the
claim language,42 and because of the Markman decision, many
district courts now have a hearing before the trial in which the
court interprets the claim language (called a "Markman trial"
or a "Markman hearing").43  A district court's claim
interpretation is an interlocutory order.44  Because claim
interpretation often makes or breaks a litigant's case, critics
argue that after claim interpretation, the courts should allow
parties to appeal the claim interpretation to the Federal Circuit
in an interlocutory appeal,45 rather than allowing a lengthy
trial to occur before a final judgment is issued and then
allowing a party to appeal the judge's interpretation of the
41. Markman, 517 U.S. at 391. The Federal Circuit's interpretation of
patent claims is binding on district courts. See Moore N. Am., Inc., v. Adams
Inv. Co., No. 4-99-CV-90376, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20958, at *23 (S.D. Iowa
July 27, 2000) ("mhe Federal Circuit's claim interpretations, as questions of
law, will be legally binding upon this court."); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Old Elec.
Indus. Co., 15 F. Supp. 2d 166, 175 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that the Federal
Circuit's interpretation of two patents, prior to Markman, was binding on the
district court in a post-Markman action).
The Federal Circuit has clarified that the Markman decision solely
addresses the role of judge and jury at the trial level. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
42. The American Bar Association reported that in 1999, 7.8% of the time,
claim construction proceedings were conducted before discovery; 21.9% were
during discovery; 57.8% were after the close of discovery, but before trial; and
"12.5% of the reported claim construction proceedings were during trial-half
before closing argument and half after." Edward V. Filardi & Meir Y. Blonder,
How to Prepare & Conduct Markman Hearings, 665 PLI 237, 247 (2001).
43. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.,
93 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the district court held a
hearing on claim interpretation and referring to it as a "Markman Hearing").
See generally Frank M. Gasparo, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and
Its Procedural Shock Wave: The Markman Hearing, 5 J.L. & POLY 723, 724-25
(1997) (describing Markman hearings generally); Werner Sterner, Note and
Comment, The Doctrine of Equivalents after Hilton Davis and Markman, and
a Proposal for Further Clarification, 22 NOVA L. REV. 783, 813 (1998) (same).
44. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1479 (Newman, J., additional views); Vivid
Techs. Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D. Mass. 1997), affd,
200 F.3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
45. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over orders involving a controlling
question of law for which there is a substantial ground for a difference of
opinion. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), (c)(1) (2000); see also supra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit).
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claim language.46 The Federal Circuit, however, has not
granted interlocutory appeals for claim interpretation.47
Critics suggest that Markman did not meet its goal of
uniformity, especially because the Federal Circuit reviews
claim interpretation de novo,48 and overrules forty percent of
46. See Gasparo, supra note 43, at 766-67 (arguing that interlocutory
appeals on claim interpretation should be freely granted after Markman
hearings); Craig Allen Nard, Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next
Century: Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 355 (urging the Federal Circuit to grant interlocutory appeals
after Markman hearings).
47. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1479 (Newman, J., additional views)
("Although the district courts have extended themselves, and so-called
'Markman hearings' are common, this has not been accompanied by
interlocutory review of the trial judge's claim interpretation. The Federal
Circuit has thus far declined all such certified questions...."); Flores v.
Union Pac. R.R., No. Misc. 474, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31117, at *3 (Fed. Cir.
Nov. 14, 1996) (unpublished) (refusing to accept a case certified for
interlocutory appeal after a Markman hearing); Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa
Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (W.D. Va. 2001) (noting that "the lack of
any realistic opportunity for Federal Circuit review greatly outweighs the
adequacy of the hearing and the nature of the Markman Order"); Schering
Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377 (D. Del. 1999) (noting that "to
date the Federal Circuit has declined interlocutory review of claim
construction decisions in all certified questions brought before it" and "[tihe
Federal Circuit disfavors direct appeals from Markman decisions" (citing
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1479 (Newman & Mayer, JJ., additional views)), affd in
part, 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
In response to the TM Patents court's suggestion that claim interpretation
is appealable, patent litigator Joseph N. Hosteny wrote,
Pardon me, I must pause here to catch my breath-after I stop
laughing, that is! Can anyone tell me of one case where the Federal
Circuit has accepted an interlocutory appeal of a claim construction
ruling? Of course not. The Federal Circuit has refused to do so,
because the ball game isn't over. If the Federal Circuit says the ruling
can't be appealed, then how can we possibly say that a claim
construction ruling is in any sense final?
There is no such thing as an appealable claim construction ruling.
Joseph N. Hosteny, Litigators Corner: Let's Make a Bad Idea Even Worse,
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Aug. 2001, at 26; see also Peter J. Ayers, Armed and
Ready: Defeating Patent Infringement Claims by Summary Judgment, 81 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 421, 448 n.168 (1999) (noting that the Federal
Circuit has not accepted an interlocutory appeal from a Markman hearing).
The Federal Circuit has suggested that there is a strong public interest in
settlement of patent litigation because patent litigation is so complicated and
expensive. See, e.g., Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1473 & n.5 (Fed.
Cir. 1989); Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The
average patent infringement suit costs $1.5 million. Gwendolyn Dawson,
Note, Matchmaking in the Realm of Patents: A Call for the Marriage of Patent
Theory and Claim Construction Procedure, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1257, 1272 (2001).
48. See In re Asahi/Am. Inc., 68 F.3d 442,444 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that
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the claim constructions it hears.4 9 Other scholars applaud the
Markman decision, predicting it will bring greater uniformity
to patent claim interpretation. 50
C. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In the interests of efficiency and finality, some judgments
have a preclusive effect on later judgments. Issue preclusion,51
or collateral estoppel, bars relitigation of issues that were
actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding by
a valid and final judgment if the determination was essential to
the judgment.52 In contrast, res judicata,53 or claim preclusion,
"[t]he Federal Circuit reviews questions of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard," while "questions of law are subject to full and independent review"
called de novo review).
49. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1476 & n.4 (Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that
one study shows a forty percent reversal rate, basing this figure on a survey of
every patent decision rendered by the Federal Circuit between April 5, 1995,
and November 24, 1997); William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to
Markman: A Prescription for the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 55, 67 (1999) ("Although, according to the Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court, Markman should have ushered in greater uniformity,
predictability, and certainty in patent litigation, many believe that the holding
has had the opposite effect. This is largely because Federal Circuit review of
claim interpretation is de novo."); Greg J. Michelson, Note and Comment Did
the Markman Court Ignore Fact, Substance, and the Spirit of the Constitution
in its Rush Toward Uniformity?, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1749, 1776 (1997)
("[Allocating all issues of construction to the court will not guarantee the
uniformity desired by Congress because district court judges remain free to
disagree with one another as do different panels of the federal circuit.").
50. See Sue Ann Mota, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.: Patent
Construction is Within the Exclusive Province of the Court Under the Seventh
Amendment, 3 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 28 (1997) (MThe Markman decision will
grant uniformity and expediency in patent claim interpretations and will force
inventors to write patent claims clearly to exactly describe the invention."), at
http'//law.richmond.edu/joltt/v3il/mota.html.
51. When an issue is decided on the merits, issue preclusion is equivalent
to collateral estoppel. When an issue is not decided on the merits, issue
preclusion is equivalent to direct estoppel. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. b (1982). In this Note, issue preclusion and collateral
estoppel will be used interchangeably.
52. See In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) ("When an issue of fact or
law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusiv in
a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim."); 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
132.0112] (3d ed. 1997) ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential
to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action
between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.").
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prevents the same parties from relitigating claims that were
not raised in the original litigation if the claims arose from the
same transaction or occurrence. 54 Collateral estoppel, unlike
claim preclusion, does not need to be mutual and, therefore,
parties who were not involved in the original litigation can
raise the defense.55 While any litigant may assert collateral
estoppel, it can be held against only those who were parties (or
in privity with parties) in the earlier proceeding.56 Third
parties can use nonmutual collateral estoppel defensively
against a plaintiff57 or offensively against a defendant. 58 A
Some circuits do not require that the same parties be involved for
collateral estoppel to apply. This doctrine is called nonmutual collateral
estoppel. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. Some circuits only
allow offensive collateral estoppel, while other circuits allow use of defensive
collateral estoppel as well. See infra notes 56-58.
53. Res judicata actually encompasses both issue preclusion and claim
preclusion. See 18 MOORE ETAL., supra note 52, %% 131.10[1], 133.01[41 [a]-[b].
Claim preclusion is often called "true res judicata" and the terms are often
used interchangeably, 18 id. 131.10[1] [a], as they will be in this Note.
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18-26 (1982); 18
MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, 131.10.
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982); see also 6
CHISUM, supra note 8, § 19.02[21[f][ii] (distinguishing res judicata requiring
mutuality-i.e., claim preclusion-from collateral estoppel absent mutuality-
i.e., issue preclusion); 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (1981) (distinguishing issue preclusion and claim
preclusion); T. Whitley Chandler, Note, Prosecution History Estoppel, the
Doctrine of Equivalents, and the Scope of Patents, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465,
514(2000).
56. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980); Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979); Pall Corp. v. Fisher Scientific Co., 962 F.
Supp. 210, 213-14 (D. Mass. 1997) (noting that offensive use of collateral
estoppel of validity of the patent in the patentee's subsequent action against a
litigant who was not a party to nor represented in the original action would
violate due process).
57. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
349-50 (1971) (allowing use of defensive nonmutual issue preclusion).
58. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 337 (allowing use of offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion). See generally James G. Hazard et al., Note, Mutuality of
Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment: The Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 1002, 1002 (1979) ("examin[ing] the practical implications"
of the Supreme Court's holding in favor of an offensive use of collateral
estoppel); John M. Swalm III, Note, The Offensive Use of Non-Mutual
Collateral Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment, 9 STETSON L. REV. 182, 184-
85'(1979) ("analyz[ing] the [Parklane] Court's reasoning" and discussing "the
potential effects of the decision").
While both defensive and offensive collateral estoppel are theoretically
available to third parties, in Blonder-Tongue, the Supreme Court noted the
effective disparity in the actual allowance of offensive versus defensive
collateral estoppel:
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party asserting59 nonmutual collateral estoppel must prove
that (1) the issue is identical to the issue decided in the prior
action, (2) the issue was litigated in the prior action, (3) the
determination was essential to the final judgment of the prior
action, and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is
sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
the prior action.60 A patent owner 61 may avoid collateral
estoppel by showing that he did not have a "fair opportunity
procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue his claim
the first time,"62 or that it would otherwise be unfair to do so. 63
[Tihe authorities have been more willing to permit a defendant in a
second suit to invoke an estoppel against a plaintiff who lost on the
same claim in an earlier suit than they have been to allow a plaintiff
in the second suit to use offensively a judgment obtained by a
different plaintiff in a prior suit against the same defendant.
402 U.S. at 329-30. But cf Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 483 F. Supp. 49, 52-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting the harmful effect
of offensive collateral estoppel on an absent patent owner).
At the same time, the trend is toward recognizing no inherent difference
between offensive and defensive issue preclusion, 'although a stronger
showing that the prior opportunity to litigate was adequate may be required'"
for offensive collateral estoppel. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331 n.16 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 Reporter's Note at 99).
59. Collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be plead, and
the burden of proof is on the party asserting the doctrine. 18 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 52, 9I 132.05[1] ("The party asserting issue preclusion or collateral
estoppel bears the burden of showing with clarity and certainty what was
determined by the prior judgment."); see Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co.,
443 F.2d 1035, 1038 (5th Cir. 1971).
60. See Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 260 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citing In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Some courts
add a fifth element requiring the law of the jurisdictions to be similar. See,
e.g., Comair Rotron, Inc. v. Nippon Densan Corp., 49 F.3d 1535, 1537 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) ("The defendant [asserting collateral estoppel] must show that...
the controlling facts and applicable legal rules were the same in both actions.")
(citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-55 (1979)). This
additional element is particularly important for foreign patent litigation. See,
e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Daig Corp., 789 F.2d 903, 907-08 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Stein
Assocs., Inc. v. Heat & Control, Inc., 748 F.2d 653, 656-57 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
61. Once a party asserting collateral estoppel meets the burden of proof,
the burden is on the nonmovant to establish a reason not to apply the doctrine.
See Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier Corp., 745 F.2d 651, 655 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam).
62. Eisel v. Colum. Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (D. Mass. 1960),
quoted in Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 333; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982) (listing circumstances under which a party did not
have a full and fair opportunity to litigate).
63. See Freeman, 30 F.3d at 1467 (noting that issue preclusion is based on
the principle of fairness and that "under certain circumstances, where all of
the requirements of issue preclusion have been met, the doctrine will not be
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The doctrine of collateral estoppel is designed to "relieve parties
of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial
resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage
reliance on adjudication."64 It is also used to assure parties of
the finality of decisions.65
Collateral estoppel in patent litigation is treated the same
as it would be treated in any other kind of litigation. 66 Because
collateral estoppel is not unique to patent cases, the Federal
Circuit applies the law of the regional circuit court 67 and
reviews a district court's decision on collateral estoppel de
novo.68 Most circuits use the basic four-part test or a similar
variation.69
applied"); Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1574-75
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (same); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. at 164
n.11 ("Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the
quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation.");
Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 324-25 (noting that "overriding fairness"
considerations may dictate that collateral estoppel should not apply).
64. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
65. See Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that issue preclusion creates "finality and
repose").
66. See Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
67. See Epic Metals Corp. v. H.H. Robertson Co., 870 F.2d 1574, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1989); 8 CHISUM, supra note 8, § 21.02[5] [b] [iv] [D] ("The Federal
Circuit applies regional circuit law to procedural matters that are not unique
to patent law. Issues to which the Federal Circuit has applied regional circuit
law include.., the law of the case doctrine and res juicata. . . .") (footnotes
omitted).
68. See United Techs. Corp. v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 189 F.3d
1338, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
69. See, e.g., Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000);
NLRB v. Thalbo Corp., 171 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1999); Smith v. SEC, 129
F.3d 356, 362 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc); In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Ramsay v. INS, 14 F.3d 206, 210 (4th Cir. 1994); Foster v.
Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 480 (Fed Cir. 1991); La Preferida, Inc. v.
Cerveceria Modelo, S.A. de C.V., 914 F.2d 900, 905-06 (7th Cir. 1990); In re
McWhorter, 887 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Haize v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 576, 579 (3d Cir. 1976). The four-part test is
consistent with the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 27 (1982).
Some courts use three elements to determine if collateral estoppel applies.
See Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1992) (using
the following test for collateral estoppel: (1) the issue at stake must be
identical to the one alleged in the prior litigation, (2) the issue must have been
actually litigated in the prior litigation, and (3) the determination of the issue
in the prior litigation must have been a critical and necessary part of the
judgment in the earlier action); see also Holmes v. Jones, 738 F.2d 711, 713
(5th Cir. 1984) (same). Although the "fifll and fair opportunity to litigate"
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II. PRE- AND POST-MARLAN CASES ADDRESSING
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Before the Markman decision, courts submitted disputes
concerning the meaning of patent claims to the jury,70 thereby
precluding finality prior to final judgment for collateral
estoppel purposes.71 The Federal Circuit held that when the
scope of a patent claim was determined in a prior infringement
action, that determination had preclusive effect in a later
case.72 After Markman, the applicability of previous cases is
uncertain.73
Collateral estoppel acquired unique significance after the
Markman decision. Only recently have district courts
determined under what circumstances collateral estoppel
applies to an earlier claim interpretation.7 4 Scholars suggest
that after Markman, courts will be more likely to utilize
collateral estoppel for claim interpretation because the court
will have a better understanding of how the earlier court made
element is not strictly written into the three-part test, it is implicit within the
analysis.
The Ninth Circuit adds the requirement that collateral estoppel will only
apply among the same parties. See Clark, 966 F.2d at 1320. In the Eighth
Circuit, the four-part test is used. See Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v.
Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904, 922 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Stoebner v. Parry, 91 F.3d
1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 1996)). The Eighth Circuit also prohibits nonmutual
collateral estoppel and adds a fifth requirement that the party collateral
estoppel is asserted against be a party or in privity with a party in the prior
action. See id. (citing Wellons, Inc. v. T.E. Ibberson Co., 869 F.2d 1166, 1168
(8th Cir. 1989)).
70. See Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft,
m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
71. See id.
72. See Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 5 F.3d 514, 518 (1993).
73. For example, the TM Patents court rejected pre-Markman precedent
on collateral estoppel. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 378
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); see infra note 121.
74. Compare Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d
464, 469-70 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding that collateral estoppel did not apply to
the claim interpretation), and Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int'l,
LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664-65 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (same), with Edberg v. CPI-
The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 190, 195-96 (D. Conn. 2001)
(holding collateral estoppel applies to claim interpretation), Abbott Labs. -V.
Dey, L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667, 670-71 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (same), TM Patents, 72
F. Supp. 2d at 375-76 (same), Sec. People, Inc. v. Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc., 59 F.
Supp. 2d 1040, 1045-46 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (same), affid mem., 243 F.3d 555 (Fed.
Cir. 2000), and Masco Corp. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 337, 344 (2001)
(same).
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its decision.75 It is unclear when district court interpretations
bind other district courts. 76 Only a few district court decisions
have dealt with the subject of collateral estoppel of claim
interpretation since Markman, and these decisions are not
uniform.77 The Federal Circuit has not yet ruled on the
preclusive effect that claim interpretation should have in later
litigation.78 Although collateral estoppel applies if all of the
elements are met,79 it is not clear when the elements are met.
Both the pre- and post-Markman cases relevant to collateral
estoppel of claim interpretation are outlined below.
A. THE ISSUE MUST BE IDENTICAL To THE ISSUE DECIDED IN THE
PREvious LITIGATION
If the same patent claim language is at issue in the
lawsuit, the issue is identical and the first factor of the
collateral estoppel test is satisfied.80 When different claim
75. E.g., Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable
Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 83 n.357 (1997) ("It seems likely that in the post-Markman era, in which
courts have been given plenary authority to interpret the claims and must
elaborate more fully on their claim interpretations and the supporting
rationales, issue preclusion on claim interpretation determinations will be
more commonplace.").
76. Federal Circuit claim interpretations are binding on lower courts. See
supra note 41.
77. See cases cited supra note 74.
78. See Filardi & Blonder, supra note 42, at 264 ("[TM Patents, Graco, and
Abbott] suggest uncertainty in the lower courts as to the applicability of the
pre-Markman jurisprudence on collateral estoppel vis a vis claim construction.
Accordingly, until the Federal Circuit revisits this issue, patentees would be
well advised to exercise caution in settling an action after a claim construction
ruling is entered. Except as to the same party, the patentee cannot use the
interpretation offensively, but the interpretation may be used defensively
against it by another accused infinger.").
79. See Anthony Zeuli, Patent Claim Construction and Issue Preclusion,
BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 2001, at 38 (noting that collateral estoppel is
appropriate for claim interpretation if the elements are met).
80. See Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464,
466 (W.D. Va. 2001) (stating that the record showed that the issue was the
same because the same two patent claims were at issue); Abbott Labs. v. Dey,
L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667, 669 (N.D. IlM. 2000) ("The claim construction issues
disputed in this case are the same issues litigated in the [first] case."); TM
Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting
that the parties agreed that the issues raised in both proceedings were
identical when the same patent was at issue); Sec. People, Inc. v. Medeco Sec.
Locks, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1044-45 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("There is no
question that the same issues of claim construction are present in this action
as were present in the prior action. The court interpreted the ... patent claims
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language is at issue, collateral estoppel does not apply. 81 It is
common for patents to contain the same claim language or
specification as other patents, such as if the patents are
"related" as continuations, continuations-in-part, or divisional
patents.82 If the identical claim language is at issue, collateral
estoppel may apply to the language that was actually litigated,
even if the same patent claim is not at issue.83 The Federal
Circuit has held that different claims with the same language
posed the "identical issue" for estoppel purposes.84 The only
post-Markman decision on the issue, Masco Corp. v. United
States, supports the use of collateral estoppel for the same
claim language, even if the same patent is not at issue.85
as a matter of law, and expressly delineated the key terms. And the court held
that... [the invention] did not infringe the ... patent."), affd mem., 243 F.3d
555 (Fed. Cir. 2000). But see Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int'l, LLC,
77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("[Ihe previous litigation involved
only the interpretation of the term 'unitary central hub member' found in
claim 1 of the '437 patent, as the parties in that case did not dispute the
meaning of the entire claim."). See generally C. Jobl Van Over, Collateral
Estoppel and Markman Rulings: The Call for Uniformity, 45 ST. LOUIs U. L.J.
1151, 1161-65 (2001) (discussing the requirement that the issue be identical to
the prior determination).
81. See P.A.T., Co. v. Ultrak, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1518, 1520-21 (D. Kan.
1996) (refusing to allow collateral estoppel on a Markman hearing when the
claim language at issue was not decided in the previous case); see also Foster
v. Hallco Mfg. Co., No. 96-1399, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18989, at *11 (Fed. Cir.
July 14, 1997) (noting that "because the claim language at issue in this appeal
is different from the claim language previously litigated, this court need not
address Foster's argument that Markman requires that the first claim
construction of a patent litigated to final judgment is the 'fixed' claim
construction for that patent") (citation omitted); Interconnect Planning Corp.
v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that it was an "erroneous
legal conclusion" to use collateral estoppel on a reissue patent when the claims
"although not substantially identical, involved some substantially identical
'issues'); Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont'l Plastics, Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 895-96
(10th Cir. 1979) (holding that reissue claims were not substantially identical
to the original claims, and therefore because the same patent claims were not
at issue collateral estoppel did not apply).
82. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("We
note that independent claims 14, 15, and 19 were not specifically addressed by
the district court. However, each of these claims includes the phrase 'buoyant
uplift' specifically addressed by the district court.... ").
84. See id. at 1465-67.
85. 49 Fed. Cl. 337 (2001). Masco's corporate predecessor, LaGard, Inc.,
charged Mas-Hamilton with infringement. In response, Mas-Hamilton sued
LaGard, Inc. for declaratory judgment of non-infringement in the Eastern
District of Kentucky. Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d
700 (E.D. Ky. 1997), affd, 156 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The district court
held a Markman hearing to determine the scope of the patent claim language,
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B. THE ISSUE MUST HAvE BEEN LITIGATED INTHE PREvIous LITIGATION
For collateral estoppel to apply, the issue must have been
litigated in the prior action.8 6 This requirement is usually
satisfied if the parties in the original action disputed the claim
element construed by the court, and the claim element was
decided.8 7  This factor may not be met if the issue was
abandoned, 88 if the court in the earlier proceeding noted it was
not deciding the issue,89 if the parties in the earlier proceedings
stipulated to the facts,90 or if the prior judgment was a consent
judgment.9 1 All of the post-Markman cases to decide whether
and determined that the accused device did not infringe. Id. at 719, 740.
Later, in Masco Corp. v. United States, Masco alleged that the United States
was infringing two of its patents. 49 Fed. Cl. at 338. The United States Court
of Federal Claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000), held that collateral estoppel
allows the claim interpretation of a patent to be used in a later litigation of a
continuation of that patent. 49 Fed. Cl. at 342. The patents were
continuations of the patent in the earlier lawsuit, and the language at issue
was the same. Id. at 338. The court was careful to clarify that estoppel
applied to the language already litigated, and that estoppel did not necessarily
apply to the issues specific to the different patents. Id. at 342.
86. See Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 260 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citing Freeman, 30 F.3d at 1465).
87. See Freeman, 30 F.3d at 1466; Mother's Rest., Inc. v. Mama's Pizza,
Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
88. See 18 MOORE ETAL., supra note 52, 132.03[2] [el ("An issue that was
raised but abandoned was not actually litigated for purposes of issue
preclusion.").
89. See 18 id. 132.03[2][fi].
90. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 804 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1986) ("A
fact established in prior litigation not by judicial resolution but by stipulation
has not been 'actually litigated' ..... ); Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 869 F. Supp.
1076, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("An issue is not 'actually litigated' if the action
was settled by stipulation."), affd sub nom. Tribune Co. v. Abiola, 66 F.3d 12
(2d Cir. 1995).
91. See Kearns v. Gen. Motors Corp., 94 F.3d 1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting that '[i]n the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or
default, none of the issues is actually litigated' and issue preclusion does not
apply") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e (1982)).
Some courts have held that a consent judgment may have preclusive effect if
the parties manifest such an intent. See Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d
1469, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating in dictum, "[ilssue preclusion may also
arise... by reason of a... consent decree. Under the latter, the primary
consideration is the intent of the parties.") (citing 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 55, § 4443, at 382); see also 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52,
132.03[2][i][ii ("[Issue preclusion does not apply with respect to any issue in
an action subsequent to a consent judgment."); 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE'S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 30.05[5] (2001).
A consent judgment is a judgment that the parties agree to and the court
enters into the record. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (7th ed. 1999).
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collateral estoppel applies to claim interpretation have
determined this requirement is fulfilled if claim interpretation
of the language at issue occurs.92 If the court interpreted claim
language and both parties presented cases, the "actually
litigated" requirement is satisfied.93
C. THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IS SOUGHT MUST
HAVE HAD A FULL AND FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE IN THE PREVIOUS
LITIGATION
Both parties must have had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate for collateral estoppel to apply.94 Whether the parties
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate may hinge on several
judicially determined factors. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, the Supreme Court set
forth the appropriate legal test for determining whether a party
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a patent in a prior
action.95 When the court interprets the claim, and both sides
92. See Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464,
466 (W.D. Va. 2001) (stating that the "actually litigated" element was met
after a lengthy Markman hearing on the claim construction); Abbott Labs. v.
Dey, L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667, 669-70 (N.D. IlM. 2000) (stating the "actually
litigated" element was met because the parties "briefed and argued the issues"
before the judge); Sec. People, Inc. v. Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d
1040, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("It is clear from the record presented to this court
that those issues were actually litigated by parties and conclusively
determined by the court in the first case. The record in that case demonstrates
that the issues were fully briefed, that the parties submitted expert testimony
in support of their arguments, and that the court held a hearing on the
issues."), affd mem., 243 F.3d 555 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Masco Corp. v. United
States, 49 Fed. Cl. 337, 342 (2001) ("Therefore, the Court finds that the issue
of whether the X-07 lever is pushed or pulled into engagement is identical to
an issue decided in the Kentucky district court and was actually litigated in
the Kentucky district court.").
93. See Van Over, supra note 80, at 1165-66 (discussing the requirement
of "actually litigated" and agreeing that the actually litigated requirement is
met with claim interpretation).
94. See Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 260 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citing In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
95. 402 U.S. 313, 329-34 (1971). The Court recognized that the
determination of a "full and fair chance" to litigate was not always an easy
chore. Id. at 333. The Court stated that, in addition to whether the patentee
litigated in her chosen forum and had an incentive to fully litigate, when
determining if a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, a court may
consider (1) whether the patentee was the plaintiff in the prior suit and chose
to litigate at that time and place, (2) whether the patentee was prepared to
litigate to the finish against the defendant involved, (3) if the issue is
obviousness, whether the first validity determination used the standards
announced in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12-24 (1966), (4) whether
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litigate the issue, it is clear the "full and fair opportunity to
litigate" requirement is met.96
D. THE DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUE MUST BE ESSENTIAL TO THE FINAL
JUDGMENT OF THE PREvioUs LITIGATION
The party asserting collateral estoppel must prove that the
determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment
of the previous litigation.97 There are two main requirements
associated with this element: (1) the presence of a final
judgment, and (2) the determination in the prior adjudication
was essential to that judgment.98 When the court interprets
the claim language, the patentee loses on infringement, and the
court issues a final judgment, this factor is met.99
opinions filed in the first case indicate that the prior case was one of those rare
instances where the court or jury failed to grasp the technical subject matter
and issues, (5) whether the first court made the pertinent legal inquiries, and
(6) whether without fault of her own the patentee was deprived of crucial
evidence or witnesses in the first litigation. 402 U.S. at 333. The Court also
noted that "[iun the end, decision will necessarily rest on the trial courts' sense
ofjustice and equity." Id. at 334.
96. See Kollmorgen, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (stating that the "full and fair
opportunity" to litigate element was met after a lengthy Markman hearing on
the claim construction); TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370,
375 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that both parties agreed that there was a full and
fair opportunity to litigate because a Markman hearing occurred); Sec. People,
59 F. Supp. 2d at 1045 ('The record again demonstrates that both parties had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the patent issues. It is undisputed that
[the plaintiff] was represented by counsel in the first case, and [plaintiffs]
counsel filed extensive briefs and a record regarding the issues.").
Two recent post-Markman cases decided that collateral estoppel applies
even if the decision is on appeal. See Moore N. Am., Inc. v. Adams Inv. Co.,
No. 4-99-CV-90376, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20958, at *22-23 (S.D. Iowa July
27, 2000); Abbott, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 670. In Abbott, there was a final
judgment on infringement before the appeal. See 110 F. Supp. 2d at 670;
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 96 CV-159A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23171, at *2, *31-32 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1998) (noting that after the Markman
hearing, Abbott lost on both the claim construction issue and the infringement
issue). In Moore, the parties were appealing the claim interpretation. 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20958, at "21-22. The Abbott court applied collateral
estoppel to the claim interpretation, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 671, but the Moore
court stayed the proceeding pending the Federal Circuit decision, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20958, at *22-23.
97. See Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 260 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citing In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
98. Id.
99. See Abbott, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 670 (stating that the essential to the
final judgment element was met because the 'Judge's claim construction ruling
was necessary to the final judgment in the case concerning infringement").
20021 COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AFTER MARKMIAN 1599
1. Final Judgment
Finality for the purposes of collateral estoppel is a foggy
concept. Many courts require absolute finality before applying
collateral estoppel. 100 Some courts, however, have relaxed the
requirement of absolute finality. 10 1 They suggest a judgment
does not necessarily have to be final to preclude further
litigation of the issue, 10 2 and a better inquiry is whether the
previous judgment is sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive
effect.'03 For example, most courts agree that a jury verdict
100. See Beck v. Levering, 947 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1991); Gresham Park
Cmty. Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1242 (5th Cir. Unit B Aug. 1981); Fund
for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 794 F. Supp. 1015, 1024 (D. Mont. 1991), af'd, 962
F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1992).
101. See, e.g., Recoveredge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1295 (5th Cir.
1995) (noting that a final judgment includes a conclusive verdict rendered by a
jury even if the judgment has not yet been entered); Metromedia Co. v.
Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 366 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[The concept of finality for
collateral estoppel purposes 'includes many dispositions which, though not
final in that [end of litigation] sense, have nevertheless been fully litigated.'")
(quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 955
(2d Cir. 1964)); John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of the United Food &
Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 563-64 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that the
verdict at the liability phase of the trial had an issue preclusive effect even
though the liability verdict was not immediately appealable because the
damages phase of the trial had not concluded); Dyndul v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d
409, 412 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1980) (explaining that the concept of finality is more
flexible in the context of issue preclusion and it -may mean little more than
that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court
sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again.") (quoting
Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961));
Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir.
1979) (holding that an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary injunction "will
be given preclusive effect if it is necessarily based upon a determination that
constitutes an insuperable obstacle to the plaintiffs success on the merits");
United Bus. Communications, Inc. v. Racal-Milgo, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1172,
1184-85 (D. Kan. 1984) (noting that the prior decision of patent invalidity was
"final" for collateral estoppel purposes when the findings were final in all
respects except for the entry of judgment); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
519 F. Supp. 1203, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that the determination of the
issues by the jury that were subsequently affirmed by the federal appellate
court satisfied the finality requirement of issue preclusion); 18 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 52, 132.03[5][b][i] ("Issue preclusion, however, unlike
appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, does not require a judgment that ends
the litigation and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment."). The Fifth Circuit, however, requires an actual final judgment
before collateral estoppel will be applied. See, e.g., Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v.
Insured Lloyd's, 786 F.2d 1265, 1269 (5th Cir. 1986).
102. See cases cited supra note 101.
103. See Still v. Michaels, 791 F. Supp. 248, 251 (D. Ariz. 1992) ("A
judgment is 'sufficiently firm' where the parties were fully heard, the court
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constitutes a final judgment even if damages have not yet been
determined.104
The finality of an interlocutory order presents more
difficult questions. Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure states that any order that is not made final and does
not adjudicate all of the claims "is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment."10 5 Most courts hold that
because interlocutory orders are tentative, they should not be
given preclusive effect. 10 6 Generally, interlocutory decisions do
supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, and the decision was subject to
appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982) (noting that for application of res judicata, there must
be a final judgment, but for issue preclusion there must only be a decision that
is "sufficiently firm"); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 4434.
104. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also John Morrell, 913
F.2d at 563.
105. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See generally Total Containment Inc. v. Environ
Prods. Inc., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1316, 1316 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("[Slo long as [a] district
court has jurisdiction over [a] case, it possesses inherent power over
interlocutory orders, and can reconsider them when it is consonant with
justice to do so.") (quoting United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 605 (3d. Cir.
1973)).
106. See Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir.
1998) (noting that because of the requirement that there be a valid and final
judgment on the merits in the first action, "findings of fact and conclusions of
law made in a preliminary injunction proceeding do not preclude
reexamination of the merits at a subsequent trial"); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. F.H., 55 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to give partial
summary judgment preclusive effect); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26
F.3d 1573, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that because the validity finding
was interlocutory, it was not a final judgment, and stating, "[a] final judgment
is one that 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to
do but execute the judgment") (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229,
233 (1945)); Syntex Pharm. Int'l, Ltd. v. K-Line Pharm., Ltd., 905 F.2d 1525,
1526 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that neither an interlocutory grant of partial
summary judgment nor a denial of a motion for summary judgment is
appealable; noting that the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit over appeals
from interlocutory orders is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292; noting that in order
to appeal interlocutory orders, there must be either an order certified under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1), or a judgment otherwise appealable and final except for an
accounting under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2)); Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Insured
Lloyd's, 786 F.2d 1265, 1272 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that "an order granting
partial summary judgment 'has no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect")
(quoting Golman v. Tesoro Drilling Corp., 700 F.2d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 1983));
Del Mar Avionics v. Quinton Instruments Co., 645 F.2d 832, 834-36 (9th Cir.
1981) (noting that a grant of partial summary judgment is not appealable as a
final order, but in patent cases, appellate jurisdiction is available that allows
appeals from judgments in patent infringement actions that are final except
for the damages calculation); Arco Indus. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 730 F.
Supp. 59, 64-65 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (stating that interlocutory orders are
generally not considered final judgments for issue preclusion purposes);
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not have collateral estoppel effect, and orders that are not
appealable do not preclude further litigation.10 7 A district
court's claim interpretation is an interlocutory order.1 08
Because an interlocutory order is not considered a final
judgment, 10 9 the Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction
unless the order is certified. 10
Assocs. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Rogell, 449 So. 2d 526, 528 (La. Ct. App. 1984)
(noting that an interlocutory order is not a final judgment for preclusion
purposes). But see Siemens Med. Sys., Inc. v. Nuclear Cardiology Sys., Inc.,
945 F. Supp. 1421, 1435 (D. Colo. 1996) ("Significantly, where, as here, a party
has settled and dismissed the case with prejudice, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) no
longer applies, and whatever orders have been entered into the case are
frozen, not subject to reconsideration."); Ossman v. Diana Corp., 825 F. Supp.
870, 877-78 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding that a partial summary judgment not
made final due to settlement has collateral estoppel effect).
107. See, e.g., Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1136
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a district court's interpretation of patent claim
language cannot be used as collateral estoppel in a later litigation when the
earlier decision was not final or certified); see also Kay-R Elec. Corp. v. Stone
& Webster Constr. Co., 23 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1994) (listing the opportunity
for review as a factor in determining finality for issue preclusion); Powers v.
Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 234 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); Sandberg v. Va.
Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 347 (4th Cir. 1992) (same), vacated on other
grounds, No. 91-1873(L), 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 33286, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 7,
1993); In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); John Morrell, 913
F.2d at 563 (same); O'Reilly v. Malon, 747 F.2d 820, 822-23 (1st Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (same); Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990,
996 (7th Cir. 1979) (same); Am. Cas. Co. v. Sentry Fed. Sav. Bank, 867 F.
Supp. 50, 56 (D. Mass. 1994) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 28(1) (1982) ("Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment,
relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not
precluded .... [when] [tihe party against whom preclusion is sought could not,
as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial
action."); 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, % 132.0314 [k] [i] ("Relitigation of an
issue is not precluded if the party against whom issue preclusion is sought
could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the
initial action."). See generally Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 n.18
(1980) (stating that issue preclusion is "premised upon an underlying
confidence that the result achieved in the initial litigation was substantially
correct" and that "[iun the absence of appellate review, or of similar
procedures, such confidence is often unwarranted").
The Supreme Court has articulated a three-pronged test to determine
whether an interlocutory order is appealable. The order must (1) conclusively
determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment. See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas
Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988).
108. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (stating an appeal from a non-final
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The Federal Circuit has held that if a party cannot, as a
matter of law, appeal a judgment, that judgment does not have
preclusive effect. 111 Courts both before and after Markman
have held that in order for collateral estoppel to apply, there
must have been a final judgment on infringement or validity.'1 2
judgment is not allowed); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (stating a judgment can be
certified final); see also Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377-
78 (D. Del. 1999) (entering judgment of non-infringement upon the patentee's
request, in order to immediately appeal the courfs claim construction), affd in
part, 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Filardi & Blonder, supra note 42, at 250-
55 (listing several methods to obtain review of an adverse claim construction);
supra note 32 and accompanying text.
111. See Trilogy Communications, Inc. v. Times Fiber Communications,
Inc., 109 F.3d 739, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding if the court never enters a
final judgment on its decision a patent is invalid or certifies the interlocutory
decision for appeal, the parties cannot appeal the decision and therefore
collateral estoppel does not apply); Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469,
1474-75 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that when a party wins the litigation, but
loses on an issue, issue preclusion does not apply to a lost issue that could not
by itself be appealed); Interconnect, 774 F.2d at 1135 ("Sufficient firmness...
requires that the party against whom the estoppel is asserted have had the
right, even if not exercised, to challenge on appeal the correctness of the
earlier decision."); Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567,
1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("In a sense, a party can be said to have 'lost' if it
urged a broad scope of the claim, and the court upheld validity on a narrower
interpretation. However, if a claim is held valid and infringed on a narrower
than necessary basis, the patent owner cannot appeal. Thus, under the first
exception to issue preclusion noted in Restatement § 28(1) (availability of
review), [a party] could not invoke an estoppel against [another party] since
[the latter] won on both validity and infringement.").
112. See Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier Corp., 745 F.2d 651, 655 (Fed. Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 704
(Fed. Cir. 1983); Home Diagnostics Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 864,
870 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (noting there must be a final judgment on validity or
infringement for collateral estoppel to apply); Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 110 F.
Supp. 2d 667, 670 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (noting there was a final judgment because
the judge's claim construction was necessary to the determination of
infringement); Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 850, 852,
854 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (same) (citing Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 5 F.3d 514, 518
(Fed. Cir. 1993), affid in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 265 F.3d
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); see also In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1466 (Fed. Cir.
1994) ("[J]udicial statements regarding the scope of patent claims are entitled
to collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent infringement suit only to the
extent that determination of scope was essential to a final judgment on the
question of validity or infringement.") (quoting AB. Dick, 713 F.2d at 704); id.
("[Tlo apply issue preclusion to a claim interpretation issue decided in a prior
infringement adjudication, 'the interpretation of the claim had to be the
reason for the loss [in the prior case] on the issue of infringement.'") (quoting
Jackson Jordan, 747 F.2d at 1577); Pfaff, 5 F.3d at 518 ("The prior claim
interpretation has issue preclusive effect in the present case insofar as it was
necessary to the judgment of noninfringement in the previous case.");
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a. Settlement Before Trial
Courts are often asked to determine if settlements or
consent judgments should be given collateral estoppel effect. 113
Generally, collateral estoppel does not apply to a settlement
without a final judgment on the merits,1 14 unless it is clear the
parties so intend. 115 Settlements are usually meant to end
litigation on the claim presented, but not necessarily the issue;
thus, although claim preclusion may be appropriate, collateral
estoppel ordinarily is not.116 When parties in patent cases
settle, the Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction to review the
court's decision on claim interpretation without a certified
Molinaro, 745 F.2d at 655 ("[W]here a determination of the scope of patent
claims was made in a prior case, and the determination was essential to the
judgment there on the issue of infringement, there is collateral estoppel in a
later case on the scope of such claims... ."). See generally Filardi & Blonder,
supra note 42, at 261 ("[Cllaim construction that does not lead to a judgment
should not give rise to collateral estoppel."); Van Over, supra note 80, at 1165
("[Tihe issue of whether claim construction was actually litigated in a prior
action is subsumed by the issue of finality, meaning, whether the
determination of claim construction was litigated in a manner sufficiently
final for collateral estoppel purposes."); supra note 44 and accompanying text.
113. See 3 MOORE ETAL., supra note 91, § 30.05[5].
In the post-Markman case of Louisville Bedding Co. v. Perfect Fit
Industries, Inc., the Western District of Kentucky applied collateral estoppel to
claim interpretation from an earlier judgment, even though the final judgment
in the first case was a consent judgment. 151 F. Supp. 2d 818, 819-20 (W.D.
Ky. 2001).
114. See, e.g., Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575
F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1978); Assocs. Capital Servs. Corp. v. Loftin's Transfer
& Storage Co., 554 F.2d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Group Health
Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (D. Minn. 1999).
115. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) ("But settlements
ordinarily occasion no issue preclusion (sometimes called collateral estoppel),
unless it is clear, as it is not here, that the parties intend their agreement to
have such an effect.") (emphasis omitted); Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1379
(7th Cir. 1994) ("[Slettlement agreements not approved by a court are not
given preclusive effect.").
116. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 4443, at 384-85 ("In most
circumstances, it is recognized that consent agreements ordinarily are
intended to preclude any further litigation on the claim presented but are not
intended to preclude further litigation on any of the issues presented. Thus
consent judgments ordinarily support claim preclusion but not issue
preclusion."), quoted in Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. at 414; see also United
States v. Int'l Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 505 (1953) (noting that settlement
agreements involve claim preclusion, not issue preclusion); Aaron Basha Corp.
v. Felix B. Vollman, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 226, 229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (refusing
to grant collateral estoppel effect to a preliminary injunction when the parties
settled before trial).
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interlocutory appeal. 117 The Supreme Court has stated that
collateral estoppel was designed to promote efficiency, not to
thwart settlements."18
In the first post-Markman case to decide the collateral
estoppel effect of a claim interpretation after settlement but
before the final judgment, TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., the
Southern District of New York held that collateral estoppel
applies to claim interpretation even if the case is settled before
trial. 119 The court determined that although the parties settled
the dispute, and there was no final, appealable judgment,
finality for collateral estoppel purposes was presumed. 120 The
court rejected pre-Markman precedent on collateral estoppel,12 '
117. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; sources cited supra note
110.
118. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 347
(1971) (noting that issue preclusion is designed to promote economics, not to
thwart settlements); see also InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. OKI Am., 866 F.
Supp. 212, 214 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that settlements are highly favored in
the law and collateral estoppel should not be used to discourage settlement);
Van Over, supra note 80, at 1176-78 (suggesting that patentees will be less
likely to settle if Markman hearings are always given collateral estoppel
effect).
119. 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see Claim Construction in Settled
Case is Preclusive Under Collateral Estoppel, 59 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
J. (BNA) 132, 132 (Nov. 18, 1999) (discussing the decision in TM Patents). TM
Patents sued EMC Corporation for patent infringement. TM Patents, L.P. v.
IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375. The judge held a Markman hearing to
interpret the claim language of the patent at issue. The case is unreported but
discussed in TM Patents. Id. at 375-98. Before the case was completed, the
parties settled, and so the jury never returned a verdict on the issue of patent
infringement. Id. at 375. Later, TM Patents sued IBM for patent
infringement. Id. IBM argued that the earlier litigation collaterally estopped
TM Patents from relitigating the claim language. Id. The judge noted that
the issue was one of first impression, and agreed that TM Patents was
estopped from relitigating the claim language even though the parties in the
earlier litigation settled. Id. at 375 ("The parties have not called my attention
to any case in which a court has applied collateral estoppel to bar relitigation
of claims construction issues decided at a prior Markman hearing, and I have
not located any such decisions. Nonetheless, that proposition seems self-
evident."). The court reasoned that plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the meaning of the terms in the first case, and were therefore bound to
that decision in the second case. Id. at 375.
120. 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375-76 ("[Ilt has been settled that a judgment that is
not 'final' in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 can nonetheless be considered 'final'
in the sense of precluding further litigation of issues that were actually
determined in such a judgment."); id. at 378 ("A party who cuts off his right to
review by settling a disputed matter cannot complain that the question was
never reviewed on appeal.").
121. Id. at 378 ("[C]ases such as Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Amer.
Corp., 747 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713
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and relied on several decisions for the proposition that finality
is a stage in the litigation in which an issue "'has reached such
a stage that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it
to be litigated again."' 122 The TM Patents court held that
finality for collateral estoppel depends on (1) the nature of the
decision, (2) the adequacy of the hearing, and (3) the
opportunity for review. 123
In Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc., the
District Court of Connecticut chose to follow TM Patents and
held that in a patent infringement suit the plaintiff was
estopped from relitigating the claim construction, even though
the prior suit was settled before the determination of
infringement. 124 The court noted that "the mere fact that
F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1983); and Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 616 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1980)-are inapplicable in the post-Markman era,
at least when the district court holds a special pre-trial hearing.... ").
122. Id. at 376 (quoting Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297
F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961)). The court cited Lummus, 297 F.2d at 89; Zdanok
v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Division, 327 F.2d 944, 949, 955 (2d Cir.
1964); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 366 (2d Cir. 1992); Georgakis
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 330, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Sherman v.
Jacobson, 247 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. e (1980). TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375-77.
The Lummus court applied collateral estoppel to an interlocutory order
directing trial of arbitrability even though the issue was not appealable. 297
F.2d at 89-91. The court specifically limited its analysis to this narrow
situation when it noted the "exception to the general rule of finality in Federal
appellate procedure." Id. at 86. It noted that the interlocutory order staying
or refusing to stay an arbitration pending judicial inquiry did not rise to the
level of serious consequence. Id. The court also noted that "[w]hether a
judgment, not 'final' in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, ought nevertheless be
considered 'final' in the sense of precluding further litigation of the same issue,
turns upon such factors as the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not
avowedly tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for
review." Id. at 89.
In both Zdanok and Metromedia, the judgment was final except for the
damages calculation. Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 949, 955; Metromedia, 983 F.2d at
366. In Georgakis and Sherman there were also final judgments. Georgakis,
512 F. Supp. at 334 (applying collateral estoppel to a summary judgment);
Sherman, 247 F. Supp. at 267-72 (applying collateral estoppel to a final
judgment pending appeal).
In TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 378, the court cited the following cases
where the parties settled after there was a final judgment: Hartley v. Mentor
Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1472-73 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Wellons, Inc. v. T.E. Ibberson
Co., 869 F.2d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1989); Siemens Medical Systems, Inc. v.
Nuclear Cardiology Systems, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1421, 1436 (D. Colo. 1996); and
Ossman v. Diana Corp., 825 F. Supp. 870, 878 (D. Minn. 1993).
123. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (citing Lummus, 297 F.2d at 89).
124. 156 F. Supp. 2d 190, 195-96 (D. Conn. 2001). In 1992, the plaintiffs
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plaintiffs settled the prior case does not give this Court's prior
rulings any less preclusive effect."1 25
In the most recent case on the issue, Kollmorgen Corp. v.
Yaskawa Electric Corp., the Western District of Virginia held
that collateral estoppel does not apply to claim interpretation if
the case is settled before trial.126 Kollmorgen was decided less
than a month after Edberg.127 The Kollmorgen court rejected
the reasoning in TM Patents and did not mention the Edberg
decision.128  The court held that a consensual settlement
sued Millipore Corporation for infringement of the patent. See Environetics,
Inc. v. Millipore Corp., 923 F. Supp. 344, 345 (D. Conn. 1996). The judge held
a Markman hearing to interpret the patent claim language, and denied the
defendant's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement to all but one
claim. Id. at 346-50.
Following rulings on claim construction but before trial, the case settled.
Edberg, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 192. The Edberg court cited TM Patents, 72 F.
Supp. 2d at 375-79, and Abbott Laboratories v. Dey, L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667,
669-71 (N.D. Ill. 2000), for support of its decision to apply collateral estoppel
and distinguished Graco Children's Products, Inc. v. Regalo International,
LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (E.D. Pa. 1999). Edberg, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 195-
96.
125. Edberg, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
126. 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 470 (W.D. Va. 2001). Allen-Bradley Co., L.L.C.
and Reliance Motion Control, Inc. sought declaratory judgment in the Eastern
District of Wisconsin of non-infringement of certain patents owned by
Kollmorgen. Allen-Bradley Co. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 199 F.R.D. 316 (E.D. Wis.
2001). Kollmorgen asserted counterclaims alleging infringement. Id. at 317.
After a series of dismissals, the court was left to construe two of the patents at
issue. Id. The court held a Markman hearing to construe the claims of the
two patents. Id. The parties entered into settlement negotiations and reached
an agreement conditioned on the vacation of the Markman order. Id. The
court denied Kollmorgen's motion to vacate its claim construction. Id. at 320.
The Allen-Bradley court refused to vacate the Markman hearing decision to
facilitate settlement between the parties. Id. at 319-20. The court reasoned
that if settlement is preferable at the district court level, rather than at the
appellate level, it should also be preferable at a pre-Markman level as opposed
to a post-Markman level. Id. at 318-19. The court also noted the uncertainty
surrounding the collateral estoppel effect of a Markman hearing. Id. at 320
n.1 ("Indeed, whether this court's Markman order would have preclusive effect
is open to some debate.") (citing TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d 370; Graco
Children's Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d 660; and Abbott, 110 F. Supp. 2d 667).
A month before the Allen-Bradley case went to trial, Kollmorgen filed a
patent infringement claim against Yaskawa for infringement of the same
patents. 147 F. Supp. 2d at 466. Yaskawa filed a motion to adopt the
Wisconsin Court's Markman order. Id. at 465.
127. Kolmorgen was decided on June 29, 2001, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 464,
while Edberg was decided on June 4, 2001, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 190.
128. Kollmorgen, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 467 ("The facts in TM Patents bear a
striking similarity to the case at bar .... The Court in TM Patents...
incorrectly interpret[s] Markman's ruling as nullifying pre-existing Federal
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between the parties did not constitute a "final judgment," the
claim interpretation was not essential to the "non-existent final
judgment," and collateral estoppel did not apply.129 The
Kollmorgen court held that a ruling is final for collateral
estoppel purposes if the ruling is essential to the final judgment
on infringement or validity.130
Although pre-Markman precedent indicates that issues
decided before settlement do not generally have collateral
estoppel effect, post-Markman cases do not necessarily agree.
In TM Patents and Edberg, the courts applied collateral
estoppel to the claim interpretation even though the parties
settled before the trial. In Kollmorgen, however, the court
rejected TM Patents and refused to apply collateral estoppel.
Some scholars agree with the result in TM Patents,131 and
others do not.132
b. Settlement After Trial
When parties settle after a final judgment, the necessary
elements of collateral estoppel are met. Before Markman, the
Supreme Court held "mootness by reason of settlement does not
justify vacatur of a judgment under review."1 33 The Court
Circuit analysis regarding collateral estoppel. Although Markman did
empower the judge, rather than the jury, to construe the patent scope and
claim at issue, it did not single-handedly redefine 'finality' for collateral
estoppel purposes.").
129. Id. at 469-70.
130. Id. at 469.
131. See, e.g., Nard, supra note 46, at 384 ("Judge McMahon [of TM
Patents] understands, correctly in my opinion, that a Markman hearing is
procedurally unique and calls into question case law and procedural rules that
were in place prior to Markman."); Van Over, supra note 80, at 1152 ("As this
Article argues, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit's sister circuits
would seem to favor the application of collateral estoppel to Markman rulings,
at least under the circumstances of both TM Patents and Graco.").
132. See, e.g., Filardi & Blonder, supra note 42, at 262 ("While the
rational[e] [in TM Patents] seems sound it does not recognize that an
established exception to collateral estoppel in a subsequent action with
another defendant, is where '[tihe issue is one of law and treating it as
conclusively determined would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for
obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon which it was based.'") (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(7) (1980)).
133. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29
(1994). The Court considered the authority of an appellate court to vacate
judgments, decrees, or orders of lower courts. Id. at 19. That authority is
derived from a specific statute that deals only with the vacatur power of"It]he
Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction." Id. at 21 (citing
28 U.S.C. § 2106).
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specifically noted the difference between post-judgment
settlement and pre-judgment settlement, and indicated a
strong preference for pre-judgment settlement. 134
Determinations that result in final judgments can be used for
collateral estoppel if they meet the requirements, regardless of
any later settlement. 135
c. Summary Judgment
It is well settled that collateral estoppel may be asserted
even if the previous litigation ended with summary
judgment. 136 The denial of summary judgment or a grant of
134. Id. at 27-28 ("[Wlhile the availability of vacatur may facilitate
settlement after the judgment under review has been rendered and certiorari
granted (or appeal filed), it may deter settlement at an earlier stage. Some
litigants, at least, may think it worthwhile to roll the dice rather than settle in
the district court, or in the court of appeals, if, but only if, an unfavorable
outcome can be washed away by a settlement-related vacatur. And the
judicial economies achieved by settlement at the district-court level are
ordinarily much more extensive than those achieved by settlement on
appeal.") (emphasis removed).
135. Id. at 29; see also United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40-
41 (1950) (allowing res judicata to be used against a party that did not move to
vacate a decision that had become moot on appeal); Hartley v. Mentor Corp.,
869 F.2d 1469, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
In Hartley v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., the plaintiffs sued
the defendants for patent infringement. 222 U.S.P.Q. 590 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
The parties litigated the meaning of the patent claims, and the court ruled
that the patent was invalid and granted summary judgment for the
defendants. Hartley, 869 F.2d at 1471. After that, the parties negotiated a
settlement that provided "for entry of a stipulated judgment dismissing
Hartley's infringement claim against 3M with prejudice." Id. Later, Hartley
sued Mentor, who purchased the license from 3M but did not pay Hartley as
stipulated by the settlement. Id. The court held that because the patent was
held invalid in the prior litigation, Hartley was collaterally estopped from
relitigating the validity of the patent. Id. at 1473. The court noted that, at
least under Ninth Circuit law, settlement agreements do not necessarily moot
prior court rulings unless the court actually vacates the order. Id.
Importantly, the court noted, "courts should favor and enforce settlement
agreements," but in this case the court declined to do so because it was not
clear that both sides intended that the settlement would vacate the judgment.
Id. at 1473 n.5; see also Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. W. Conference of
Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 721-22 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to vacate the district
court's judgment after the parties settled and allowing collateral estoppel).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Trilogy Communications, Inc. v. Times Fiber
Communications, Inc., 109 F.3d 739, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that a
summary judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b) is a final judgment);
Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 712 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(determining that the patent's validity was fully and fairly litigated even
though it was based on a motion for summary judgment); see also Nat'l
Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 910 (6th Cir. 2001);
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partial summary judgment usually does not have collateral
estoppel effect. 137
One post-Markman case to deal with the collateral estoppel
effect of a non-infringement summary judgment after claim
interpretation is Security People, Inc. v. Medeco Security Locks,
Inc. 138 The court in Security People applied collateral estoppel
to the earlier judgment of non-infringement even though the
earlier proceeding ended with summary judgment. 139 Because
the parties in the previous litigation had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the claim interpretation, and the issue of
infringement was necessarily determined for the final
summary judgment, collateral estoppel applied. 140
Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee's Int'l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1211
(10th Cir. 2001); Steen v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 F.3d 904, 912
(9th Cir. 1997).
In a pre-Markman case, the Federal Circuit held a ruling of invalidity in a
prior action collaterally estopped the parties from relitigating the issue, even
though the final judgment was a summary judgment. See Hartley, 869 F.2d at
1473.
137. See Syntex Pharms. Int'l, Ltd. v. K-Line Pharms., Ltd., 905 F.2d 1525,
1526 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that an order granting summary judgment of
infringement of a patent and denying the alleged infringer's motion for
summary judgment of invalidity did not present a final judgment from which
an appeal could be taken because the case was not fully adjudicated as to all
claims for all parties and there was no certification order); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. F.H., 55 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to give
partial summary judgment preclusive effect); Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v.
Insured Lloyd's, 786 F.2d 1265, 1272 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding "an order
granting partial summary judgment 'has no res judicata or collateral estoppel
effect") (quoting Golman v. Tesoro Drilling Corp., 700 F.2d 249, 253 (5th Cir.
1983)); Del Mar Avionics v. Quinton Instruments Co., 645 F.2d 832, 834-35
(9th Cir. 1981) (noting that a grant of partial summary judgment is not
appealable as a final order, but in patent cases, appellate jurisdiction is
available that allows appeals from judgments in patent infringement actions
that are final except for the damages calculation); Contl Airlines, Inc. v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689, 708 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (describing a partial
summary judgment order as "unappealable" because the parties settled after
judgment); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fairchild, 620 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (D.
Idaho 1985) (holding that a partial summary judgment order was not issue
preclusive), rescinded on other grounds, 624 F. Supp. 567, 568 (D. Idaho 1986).
138. 59 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 1999), affd mem., 243 F.3d 555 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
139. Id. at 1045 (citing Bates v. Union Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647, 650 (9th Cir.
1991)).
140. Id. If there was not a "proper claim construction" before the grant of
summary judgment on non-infringement, the judgment will not have collateral
estoppel effect. See Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., Nos. 01-1329, 01-1330, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 1925, at *21, 24 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 7, 2002) (refusing to apply
collateral estoppel of non-infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) when an
earlier determination of non-infringement under § 271(e)(2)(A) was decided
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2. Essential To Final Judgment
A party asserting collateral estoppel must also show that
the determination was essential to final judgment. The
Federal Circuit has declined to apply collateral estoppel to a
finding of non-infringement of a patent when the non-
infringement determination was not essential to the final
judgment. 141 The Federal Circuit has held that when the first
action is concerned with a dispute over a particular claim term,
the court's construction of the claim terms not in dispute is
"merely dictum, and therefore has no issue preclusive effect." 142
To apply collateral estoppel to claim interpretation decided in a
prior infringement adjudication, "the interpretation of the
claim had to be the reason for the loss [in the prior case] on the
issue of infringement." 143
Issues that cannot be appealed are not precluded. 1' If a
party loses on an issue, but wins the case nonetheless,
collateral estoppel does not apply.145 If a party loses on claim
construction, for example by obtaining a narrower-than-urged
before a formal claim interpretation; "This court cannot affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment of non-infringement without a proper
claim construction of the relevant claim limitations.").
141. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Comair
Rotron, Inc. v. Nippon Densan Corp., 49 F.3d 1535, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Mother's Rest., Inc. v. Mama's Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
142. Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
143. Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
144. See Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) cmt. a (1982) ("If
review is unavailable because the party who lost on the issue obtained a
judgment in his favor, the general rule of § 27 [collateral estoppel] is
inapplicable by its own terms." ); see also Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258
F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that parties are not precluded from
relitigating an issue if its determination "was merely incidental to the
judgment in the prior action"); Jackson Jordan, 747 F.2d at 1578 ("[Under the
first exception to issue preclusion... [a party cannot] invoke an estoppel
against [another party] since [the latter] won on both validity and
infringement."); Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 555 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir.
1977) (noting that "although an issue is litigated and a finding made on that
issue in prior litigation, the prior judgment will not foreclose reconsideration
of that issue if the issue was not necessary to the rendering of [a] prior
judgment"); Pinkney v. Keane, 737 F. Supp. 187, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Under
New York law, a party who has obtained a final judgment in its favor is not
normally precluded from relitigating a subsidiary issue that was decided
against it."), affd, 920 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1990).
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claim limitation, but wins on infringement, that party usually
cannot appeal the claim construction. 146 The Federal Circuit
will only hear appeals from adverse claim construction
decisions in which the party concludes its case was "irreparably
harmed by the lower court's [claim] interpretation."147 A party
that loses on parts of the case but wins in the final judgment
stage has no motivation to appeal the issues it lost. Further,
that party may not even be able to appeal the issues on which
it lost. 148
Collateral estoppel does not apply to claim interpretation if
the claim interpretation was not the reason for the loss in the
first case. 149 Before Markman, in Jackson Jordan, Inc. v.
Plasser American Corp., the Federal Circuit noted when a party
loses on claim interpretation but wins on infringement, the
party is not collaterally estopped from rearguing the claim
language. 150 In A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., another pre-
Markman case, the Federal Circuit held that in order to apply
collateral estoppel to claim interpretation, the interpretation
must have been essential to the final judgment. 151
146. See Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 375, 377 n.2 (D. Del.
1999), affd in part, 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
147. Id.
148. Id.; see also 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, 132.03[4] [k][ i] ("[A]
winning party may not appeal issues determined adversely to it by the trial
court and, as a consequence, is not barred from relitigating those issues.").
149. See Jackson Jordan, 747 F.2d at 1577-78; A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs
Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic
Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the district
court's resolution of patent invalidity was not necessary to the judgment
because the action was resolved on the ground of non-infringement, so the
court's invalidity ruling did not have collateral estoppel effect in any future
dispute ); FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 654 F. Supp. 915, 934 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(holding that claim interpretation that was not the reason for the holding of
non-infringement in the previous litigation does not have preclusive effect in
subsequent litigation in controlling the way that claim is construed).
150. 747 F.2d at 1577-78. In the first litigation, Plasser sued Canron for
patent infringement, and the court interpreted the patent claims at issue and
found that the patent was valid and not infringed. Plasser Am. Corp. v.
Canron, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 589, 608 (D.S.C. 1980). In the second litigation,
Jackson filed a declaratory judgment action against Plasser, and the district
court held that the defendant was collaterally estopped from arguing broader
claim language than was determined in the first case. Jackson Jordan, Inc. v.
Plasser Am. Corp., 219 U.S.P.Q. 922 (E.D. Va. 1983). The Federal Circuit
reversed the court's use of collateral estoppel because the plaintiff in the first
action won on both validity and infringement. Jackson Jordan, 747 F.2d at
1578.
151. 713 F.2d at 704. In a prior declaratory judgment action against A.B.
Dick, Mead Digital Systems, Inc. v. AB. Dick Co., the court held that A.B.
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In one of the first post-Markman cases on the issue of
essentiality to final judgment, Graco Children's Products, Inc.
v. Regalo International, LLC, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that collateral estoppel does not apply to
claim interpretation if the party loses on claim interpretation
but wins on infringement.1 5 2 The court specifically chose not to
follow the reasoning in TM Patents.15 3 The court followed pre-
Markman Federal Circuit precedent and held that "because
Graco won on its claim of patent infringement, but lost on a
claim interpretation issue, no [collateral estoppel] attaches to
the lost issue of claim interpretation since it could not by itself
Dick's patent claims were valid and not infringed. 521 F. Supp. 164, 185 (S.D.
Ohio 1981). Therefore, although A.B. Dick lost on the issue of infringement, it
won on the issue of validity. Id. In the later trial of AB. Dick Co. v.
Burroughs Corp., the Federal Circuit rejected giving collateral estoppel effect
to the earlier patent claim language interpretation because it was not
essential to judgment. 713 F.2d at 704. The court held that judicial
statements regarding the scope of a patent claim were hypothetical "[elxcept
in the context of validity or infringement." Id.
152. 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664-65 (E.D. Pa. 1999). In 1996, Graco sued
Century Products for patent infringement. Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v.
Century Prods. Co., No. 93-6710, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10356, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. July 23, 1996). The judge held a Markman hearing to interpret the claim
language of the patent at issue. Id. at *11. A jury trial followed, and although
the judge gave the claims a narrower interpretation than Graco would have
preferred, Graco still won on the issue of infringement. Id. Century appealed
the infringement determination and Graco filed a protective notice of cross-
appeal, but the appeals were dismissed after the parties settled. Graco, 77 F.
Supp. 2d at 662.
In 1999, Graco sued Regalo for patent infringement. Id. at 660. Regalo
argued that collateral estoppel bound Graco to the earlier claim interpretation,
relying on TM Patents. Id. at 662. The court rejected the reasoning in TM
Patents, stating,
There is no question that, by instructing courts to decide issues of
claim construction in patent cases, the Court in Markman recognized
the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent.
However, the Court in Markman did not guarantee that collateral
estoppel would apply in every case, and this Court will not extend the
Supreme Court ruling to mean as much, especially where, as here,
the circumstances of the instant action require that a different result
be reached.
Id. at 663; see also Zeuli, supra note 79, at 38 (noting that Graco was
"precluded from appealing the claim interpretation issue because it lacked
incentive to litigate the matter fully, since fit] won the prior case under the
doctrine of equivalents").
153. Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663; see also Collateral Estoppel Need Not
Bar Relitigation of Prior Claim Construction, 59 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
J. (BNA) 430, 430 (Jan. 7, 2000) (describing the split that occurred after the
Graco court rejected the reasoning in TM Patents).
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be appealed." 154
Although it seems clear from pre-Markman precedent and
the Graco decision that if a party loses on claim construction
but wins on infringement, collateral estoppel does not apply,
the pre-Markman cases the Graco court relied on have been
questioned in light of the Markman decision.155 Courts have
both followed and distinguished the Graco decision.156 Further,
some scholars question if Graco was properly decided.
157
III. THE CLAIM INTERPRETATION MUST BE ESSENTIAL
TO THE FINAL JUDGMENT ON INFRINGEMENT OR
VALIDITY FOR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO APPLY
For collateral estoppel to apply, the party asserting the
doctrine must prove four things: (1) the issue is identical to the
issue decided in the previous litigation, (2) the issue was
litigated, (3) the determination was essential to the final
judgment, and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is
sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. 158 From pre-
and post-Markman cases, no confusion as to the application of
154. Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664 (citing Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d
1469, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). The court also relied on A.B. Dick Co., 713 F.2d
at 704, Jackson Jordan, 747 F.2d at 1577, and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. a (1980). Id. See generally 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note
52, 132.03[4][k][i] ("Therefore, although the failure to appeal does not
prevent preclusion .... the inability to obtain appellate review, or the lack of
appellate review once an appeal is taken, does prevent preclusion."). Graco, 77
F. Supp. 2d at 663-64; see also P.A.T., Co. v. Ultrak, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1518,
1521 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating in dicta that the patentee was not collaterally
estopped by an earlier court's Markman hearing because in the earlier case
the patentee won on both validity and infringement); Nard, supra note 46, at
384-85 ("Judge Kelly in Graco II understandably relied upon [pre-Markman
precedent].... I am not suggesting that Judge Kelly acted imprudently in
Graco II. There is Federal Circuit precedent and, as a district court judge, he
was compelled to follow it.").
155. See Van Over, supra note 80, at 1152, 1158-59 (disagreeing with the
Graco court's determination; "As this Article argues, the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit's sister circuits would seem to favor the application of
collateral estoppel to Markman rulings, at least under the circumstances of
both TM Patents and Graco.").
156. See Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d
190, 195-96 (D. Conn. 2001) (distinguishing Graco); Kollmorgen Corp. v.
Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 (W.D. Va. 2001) (following
Graco); Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667, 671 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(distinguishing Graco).
157. See Nard, supra note 46, at 382-86; Van Over, supra note 80, at 1156-
72.
158. See supra notes 51-63.
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the first, second, or fourth elements of collateral estoppel exists
in relation to claim interpretation.
Within the third element of collateral estoppel, the
requirement that the determination be essential to the final
judgment, there are also some issues that are not in dispute.
Although no court has yet addressed whether claim
interpretation is the proper subject of collateral estoppel if the
parties settle after the final judgment, 159 the reasoning in pre-
Markman cases indicates the necessary elements of collateral
estoppel are met and the claim interpretation should be given
collateral estoppel effect. 160 Also, because a certified summary
judgment is considered a final judgment, collateral estoppel
may apply to claim interpretation in which the issue of
infringement ends with summary judgment, and both pre- and
post-Markman case law supports this conclusion.' 61 As to
whether collateral estoppel should apply to an earlier claim
interpretation, two issues remain open to dispute: (1) if the
parties settle before trial, and (2) if a patentee loses on claim
interpretation but wins on infringement. From pre- and post-
Markman precedent, it seems there should not be a special
finality to claim interpretation if it is not essential to the final
judgment on infringement or validity.
A. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CLAIM LANGUAGE IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO
THE FINAL JUDGMENT IF THE PARTIES SETTLE BEFORE TRIAL
Three recent district court cases addressed the issue of
whether collateral estoppel applies to claim interpretation if
the parties settle after the claim interpretation but before a
final judgment on infringement. 162 All three courts used the
four-part test noted above to determine if collateral estoppel
should apply.163 In TM Patents, the Southern District of New
York held collateral estoppel applied to the claim interpretation
even though the case settled before trial.164 In Edberg, the
159. Although the parties in Graco settled after trial, the court did not
consider the issue of the settlement's impact on the collateral estoppel effect of
the Markman hearing. 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664-65.
160. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
163. Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 190,
195 (D. Conn. 2001); Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp.
2d 464, 466 (W.D. Va. 2001); TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d
370, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
164. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375; see supra note 119 and
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District of Connecticut also held collateral estoppel applies to
claim interpretation even if the parties settle before trial.165 In
Kollmorgen, the Western District of Virginia held collateral
estoppel does not apply to claim interpretation if the case is
settled before trial.1 66 Although the facts in the three cases are
almost identical, the Edberg court followed the TM Patents
case, 167 while the Kollmorgen court strongly rejected the
reasoning used in TM Patents.1 68
The TM Patents and Kollmorgen courts disagreed on the
definition of final judgment. The TM Patents court took the
position that finality for collateral estoppel requires a fact
specific test that depends on "'the nature of the decision... ,
the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review."' 69
The Kollmorgen court approached finality with a test that a
ruling is final for collateral estoppel purposes if the ruling is
essential to the final judgment on infringement or validity.170
The Kollmorgen approach to finality is superior because it is
less flexible than the TM Patents test and will lead to greater
consistency in judicial decisions. Furthermore, it is consistent
with both pre- and post-Markman precedent.
1. TM Patents Test for Finality Is Inadequate
The TM Patents court rejected pre-Markman precedent on
collateral estoppell 71 and relied on several cases that held
finality is a stage where there is no reason for relitigation17 2
accompanying text.
165. 156 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
166. 147 F. Supp. 2d at 466-67.
167. 156 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
168. 147 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
169. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (quoting Lummus Co. v.
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961)); supra note 123
and accompanying text.
170. Kollmorgen, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 469; see supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
171. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 378; see supra note 121 and
accompanying text.
172. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376; see supra note 122 and
accompanying text. One scholar, critical of the "no reason for relitigation"
approach, wrote,
The fact that there is no good reason for permitting relitigation of an
issue, however, has nothing to do with whether a prior judgment
reasonably can be termed "final." That fact does not trouble these
courts, however, because they simply are not interested in whether
the prior judgment is "final." Rather, they are interested in whether
preclusion is desirable. Thus, they use the purported technical
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The court held that finality for collateral estoppel depends on
three factors: (1) the "nature of the decision," (2) the "adequacy
of the hearing," and (3) the "opportunity for review." 73 Using
this test, the court held that claim interpretation is final for
collateral estoppel purposes even if the parties settle before the
final decision on validity or infringement. 174 The TM Patents
test for finality, however, is ambiguous and will not lead to
consistency in the application of collateral estoppel. The test is
inconsistent with pre- and post-Markman cases on collateral
estoppel of claim interpretation, and the cases the court used in
support of its test are inapplicable to claim interpretation. 175
An advantage of the TM Patents test is that it gives the
court broad discretion in the application of collateral estoppel.
A corresponding disadvantage is that it does not give clear
guidance about when collateral estoppel is inappropriate.
Because the application of collateral estoppel to claim
interpretation is unclear, the ambiguity of the test could lead to
cases with very similar facts being decided differently. One of
the policies that led to the creation of the Federal Circuit is the
need for consistency in patent cases, 176 and if courts are free to
apply tests for finality that give broad discretion on finality of
collateral estoppel, the goal of consistency is frustrated.
A more serious problem with the TM Patents test is that it
is inconsistent with pre- and post-Markman precedent. Most
courts hold that the denial of summary judgment or the grant
of partial summary judgment does not have collateral estoppel
effect.177 Under the TM Patents test, collateral estoppel could
apply to such decisions. Further, before Markman, the Federal
Circuit held that "judicial statements regarding the scope of
patent claims are entitled to collateral estoppel effect in a
subsequent infringement suit only to the extent that
determination of scope was essential to a final judgment on the
question of validity or infringement."178 The TM Patents court
requirement of a final judgment as a device for shifting their focus to
whether preclusion is desirable.
Eli J. Richardson, Taking Issue With Issue Preclusion: Reinventing Collateral
Estoppel, 65 MISS. L.J. 41, 82 (1995).
173. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (citing Lummus, 297 F.2d at 89);
see supra note 123 and accompanying text.
174. TMPatents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
175. See infra notes 177-197.
176. See supra notes 31, 35 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 137.
178. A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
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used its test to apply collateral estoppel to a ruling that was not
essential to a final judgment on validity or infringement, going
against precedent.179
Even if the TM Patents court outlined the correct test for
finality, it still should not have applied collateral estoppel to
the claim interpretation based on its facts. The third prong of
the test, opportunity for review, implies that the issue can be
reviewed. Before a final judgment on validity or infringement
is made, however, there is no realistic opportunity for Federal
Circuit review of claim interpretation even if the court certifies
the issue because the Federal Circuit routinely refuses to hear
interlocutory appeals on claim interpretation.180
The TM Patents court cited several cases in support of its
test.181 The court's reliance on the cited cases, however, is
misplaced, because none of those cases dealt with a fact
situation in which the parties settled before the final
judgment. 182 All of the cited cases dealt with decisions that
were either final, certified as interlocutory, or applied narrow
exceptions to the finality requirement. 183 The cited cases
should not have been used to evaluate whether collateral
estoppel applied to claim interpretation where the parties
settled before trial without certification or final judgment.
The TM Patents court relied on the 1961 Second Circuit
see supra note 112 (listing cases holding that there must have been a final
judgment in order for collateral estoppel to apply).
179. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 378-79.
180. See supra note 47. The Kollmorgen court recognized that the test TM
Patents outlined for collateral estoppel should not preclude relitigation of
claim interpretations absent a final judgment on infringement due to the
inability to obtain review of claim interpretation. Kollmorgen Corp. v.
Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (W.D. Va. 2001) ("T]his Court
believes the lack of any realistic opportunity for Federal Circuit review greatly
outweighs the adequacy of the hearing and the nature of the Markman
Order.").
181. The court cited the following cases: Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983
F.2d 350, 366 (2d Cir. 1992); Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1472-73
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Wellons, Inc. v. T.E. Ibberson Co., 869 F.2d 1166, 1169 (8th
Cir. 1989); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Division, 327 F.2d
944, 955 (2d Cir. 1964); Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297
F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961); Siemens Medical Systems, Inc. v. Nuclear
Cardiology Systems, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1421, 1436 (D. Colo. 1996); Ossman v.
Diana Corp., 825 F. Supp. 870, 878 (D. Minn. 1993); Georgakis v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 330, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); and Sherman v. Jacobson,
247 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375-78;
see also supra note 122.
182. See cases cited supra note 181.
183. See cases cited supra note 181.
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decision Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. 184 for
support. The court in Lummus applied collateral estoppel to an
interlocutory order directing a trial of arbitrability even though
the issue was not appealable. 185 The court specifically limited
its analysis to this narrow situation when it noted the
"exception to the general rule of finality in Federal appellate
procedure."1 86 Even if the Lummus decision was not limited to
a narrowly carved-out exception to finality, the court
specifically stated that finality is different under different
circumstances, outlining the test on which TM Patents relied.187
The Lummus court created a narrow exception to the finality
requirement of collateral estoppel in a limited circumstance
and recognized that finality was a difficult issue specific to the
facts of the case.1 88
There is no reason to extend this narrow exception to claim
interpretation. There is a much greater possibility of damage
to a party in a claim interpretation than an order of
arbitrability. The Lummus case is not comparable to TM
Patents, and the narrowly carved-out exception to finality in
Lummus should not be used to dismiss the finality requirement
of collateral estoppel for claim interpretation.
The TM Patents court also relied on Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,
Durkee Famous Foods Division and Metromedia Co. v.
Fugazy.189  Reliance on these decisions is flawed. In both
Zdanok and Metromedia, the judgment was final except for the
damages calculation. 190 When a case is final except for the
damages phase, there is a narrow exception to finality in which
the decided issue may be given collateral estoppel effect. 191 The
184. 297 F.2d 80.
185. Id. at 89-91.
186. Id. at 86.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 378-79
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327
F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir. 1964); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 366 (2d
Cir. 1992)); supra note 122.
190. Metromedia, 983 F.2d at 366 ("The mere fact that the damages
awarded to the plaintiff have not been yet calculated, though normally
precluding an immediate appeal, ... does not prevent use of a final ruling on
liability as collateral estoppel.") (citation omitted); Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 955
("The mere fact that the damages of the Zdanok plaintiffs have not yet been
assessed should not deprive that ruling of any effect as collateral estoppel it
would otherwise have.").
191. See supra notes 34, 104 and accompanying text.
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TM Patents court had not even rendered a final decision on
infringement. TM Patents does not fall within this narrow
exception to absolute finality.
The TM Patents court also cited several cases in which the
parties settled after the litigation or the litigation ended in
summary judgment. 192 These cases also are not useful to the
analysis because there were final judgments in those cases,
given the parties settled after trial.193 The settlement in the
first litigation of the patent in TM Patents did not result in a
final judgment, and the court did not certify the earlier claim
interpretation for an interlocutory appeal. 194 Because there
was no final judgment in the TM Patents case, these cases are
not applicable.
The court in TM Patents questioned whether pre-Markman
precedent on collateral estoppel of claim interpretation was still
good law in light of the Markman decision. 195 The Markman
decision did not overrule Federal Circuit precedent on
collateral estoppel. Since Markman, the Federal Circuit has
clarified that the decision solely addresses the role of judge and
jury at the trial level.196 The Markman Court stated that its
decision would "promote" certainty through the use of
preclusion, though the Court noted the decision would "not
guarantee" certainty.197  This passage does not support
overruling pre-Markman case law on collateral estoppel, as TM
Patents holds. The Court's recognition that its decision would
not guarantee legal certainty indicates that it realized that
Markman rulings would not be preclusive in all circumstances.
Because the Court did not indicate when collateral estoppel
192. See supra note 122. In Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., the court
gave collateral estoppel effect to a summary judgment, 512 F. Supp. 330, 334
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), and in Sherman v. Jacobson, the court applied collateral
estoppel to a final judgment pending appeal, 247 F. Supp. 261, 267-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
193. See supra note 122. Both summary judgments and judgments on
appeal are considered final judgments. See supra notes 133-135 and
accompanying text (discussing the finality of settlement after trial); supra
notes 136-140 and accompanying text (discussing the finality of summary
judgment).
194. On the contrary, the TM Patents court asserted that "one could make
a strong case for routinely certifying an interlocutory appeal to the Federal
Circuit... following [a Markman hearing]." TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at
377 n.1.
195. See supra note 121.
196. See supra note 41.
197. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).
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should and should not be applied, it is safe to assume pre-
Markman precedent on collateral estoppel is still good law.
Some scholars have argued that the court in TM Patents
was correct. 198 They argue that "[m]ost courts hold that an
issue that has been fully adjudicated and decided by a final
interlocutory order is entitled to preclusive effect."1 99 The cases
cited in support of this argument are some of the same cases
TM Patents erroneously cited in support of the same
argument,2°° and a few other equally flawed cases.201 The cases
cited by TM Patents did not deal with a fact situation in which
the parties settled before the final judgment. 20 2 All of the cited
cases dealt with decisions that were either final, certified as
interlocutory, or applied a narrow exception to finality. Thus,
they should not be used to evaluate whether collateral estoppel
applies to claim interpretation if the parties settle before trial
without certification or final judgment. For example, in John
Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of the United Food and
Commercial Workers the court applied collateral estoppel to an
issue although the damages phase of trial had not concluded.203
This case again falls into the narrow exception of absolute
finality when only damages calculation remains.2 4 A later case
that explicitly relied on John Morrell held that collateral
estoppel did not apply when the parties settled before a verdict
198. E.g., Van Over, supra note 80, at 1171 ("In sum, the TM Patents and
Security Peoples [sic] approach to finality best reflects the policies of Markman
and the majority view that finality does not require a final appealable
judgment, as long as the patentee has had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate claim construction issues .... ").
199. Id. at 1167 (citing John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of the
United Food and Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1990); Miller
Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1979);
Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961); TM
Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375-76; Georgakis v. E. Air Lines, 512 F. Supp. 330,
334 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)).
200. Lummus, 297 F.2d 80, and Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. 330, are cited by
TMPatents. 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375-76.
201. John Morrell and Miller Brewing are not cited by TM Patents. TM
Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d 370; see also John Morrell, 913 F.2d at 563-64
(applying issue preclusion to the verdict at the liability phase of trial even
though the liability verdict was not immediately appealable because the
damages phase of the trial had not concluded); Miller Brewing, 605 F.2d at
995-96 (holding that collateral estoppel can be applied even when the previous
judgment was rendered on appeal from a preliminary injunction order).
202. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375-77.
203. See John Morrell, 913 F.2d at 563.
204. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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was rendered.205
The Security People, Inc. v. Medeco Security Locks, Inc.206
case would seem to support the reasoning in TM Patents
because the court applied collateral estoppel to a claim
interpretation of a case that settled.20 7 The Security People
case, however, involved a very different factual situation from
the one in TM Patents. In Security People, the Northern
District of California held that collateral estoppel applied to the
claim interpretation because the prior case ended with a
summary judgment motion, which is the same as a final
judgment,208 and the parties later settled.20 9 The Security
People court only applied collateral estoppel to infringement
because there was a final judgment in the earlier proceeding,
and the parties settled after this final judgment;210 Security
People did not hold claim interpretation was final enough to
warrant the use of collateral estoppel even if the parties settle
before a final judgment.211
In Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc.,212 the
District Court of Connecticut chose to follow TM Patents.213
The Edberg court held that the plaintiff was estopped from
relitigating the claim construction, even though the prior suit
settled before the determination of infringement.214 The
Edberg court blindly followed TM Patents, citing only TM
Patents and Abbott in support of its decision.215 The court
failed to recognize that in Abbott, a final judgment was
205. Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (D.
Minn. 1999) (holding that 'judgment was entered upon settlement and before
a verdict was rendered. Accordingly, this Court finds that collateral estoppel
does not apply to the motion now before it.") (citing John Morrell, 913 F.2d at
562 n.16).
206. 59 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 1999), affd mem., 243 F.3d 555 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
207. Id.; see supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
208. A summary judgment is treated the same as a final judgment for
collateral estoppel purposes. See supra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
209. 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1041, 1045; supra note 139 and accompanying text.
210. 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1045; supra note 139 and accompanying text.
211. See 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1045; supra notes 138-140 and accompanying
text.
212. 156 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Conn. 2001).
213. See id. at 195; supra note 124.
214. 156 F. Supp. 2d at 195. The court distinguished Graco, recognizing
that the facts of the case were nearly identical to those of TM Patents, and not
analogous to the Graco facts. See id. at 195-96.
215. See id. at 195.
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rendered after the claim interpretation.216 Because of the final
judgment in Abbott, that case should not be used to support
collateral estoppel if the parties settle before final judgment.
Although the Edberg court chose to follow TM Patents, it is
apparent that the court was hesitant to apply collateral
estoppel to the claim interpretation, stating, "[e]ven if plaintiffs
were not estopped from challenging the prior construction...
the Court concludes that the ruling was correct for the reasons
discussed below." 217 The court then proceeded to reinterpret
the claim language.218 Although the facts in TM Patents are
similar, the Edberg court's reliance on TM Patents was
misplaced.
2. Kollmorgen Test for Finality: A Better Approach
In Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Electric Corp., the
Western District of Virginia held that collateral estoppel does
not apply to claim interpretation if the case is settled before
trial.219 The Kollmorgen court defined finality for collateral
estoppel as a ruling that is essential to the final judgment on
infringement or validity.2 20 The Kollmorgen test for finality is
superior to the TM Patents test because it is less flexible than
the TM Patents test and will lead to greater consistency in
judicial decisions. Moreover, unlike the TM Patents test, it is
consistent with both pre- and post-Markman precedent.
Before Markman, the Federal Circuit repeatedly held that
there must be a final decision on validity or infringement for
collateral estoppel to apply.221 Since Markman, district courts
have relied on these Federal Circuit cases to note that a
judgment is final for collateral estoppel purposes if it is
necessary to the final judgment on infringement or validity.222
Further, courts generally refuse to apply collateral estoppel to
interlocutory decisions, such as partial summary judgment.223
Claim interpretation is an interlocutory decision,224 and
216. For a discussion of the Abbott decision, see supra note 96.
217. 156 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
218. Id. at 196-98.
219. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
220. Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469
(W.D. Va. 2001); see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
221. See cases cited supra note 112.
222. See cases cited supra note 112.
223. See supra note 137.
224. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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collateral estoppel should not apply prior to a final judgment on
infringement or validity. Thus, the Kollmorgen court correctly
followed both pre- and post-Markman precedent in the
formation of its test.22
There are also strong policy reasons for rejecting the use of
collateral estoppel of claim interpretation if parties settle
before trial. Patent litigation is complicated and expensive and
the Federal Circuit has repeatedly expressed the view that
there is a strong public interest in settlement of patent
litigation.2 26  If collateral estoppel is applied to claim
interpretations of cases that settle, a "chilling effect" on
settlement negotiations is inevitable.227 Binding parties to
issues that were decided before the final judgment certainly
discourages settlement, especially because claim interpretation
is practically unreviewable before a final judgment. 228 Further,
judicial economy is hurt because parties are forced to
"overlitigate" issues that might be estopped. 229
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is premised on the ideas
of consistency, efficiency, and fairness to the parties.230 The
doctrine should not be applied if it would be unfair to the
225. See 147 F. Supp. 2d at 466-70.
226. See supra note 47.
227. See Kollmorgen, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 468 (noting that granting
preclusory effect to claim construction would discourage settlement and
increase appeals to correct what the party perceives as unduly narrow claim
construction); see also Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Int'l, LLC, 77 F.
Supp. 2d 660, 664 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (same); S. Pac. Communications Co. v.
AT&T Co., 567 F. Supp. 326, 328 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 740 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (noting that parties will be less likely to settle if they know their
settlements will be used to estop them in later proceedings); Garcia v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 990 P.2d 1069, 1074-75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) ("[Applying
collateral estoppel [to an interlocutory judgment] might greatly hinder future
settlements.").
228. See supra note 47; see also Kollmorgen, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 468 ("Why
would a party settle a patent dispute, after a damaging Markman Order, with
the knowledge that it cannot appeal the district court's patent claim
construction? Parties to a settlement will lack any incentive to settle if the
virtually unreviewable Markman ruling will have a preclusive effect on other
potential patent actions.").
229. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979) (giving
judges discretion over when issue preclusion should be applied because "[i]f a
defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may
have little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are not
foreseeable"); Lisa L. Glow, Note, Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Arizona:
Fair Litigation vs. Judicial Economy, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 535, 538 (1988)
(discussing the "overlitigation" problem).
230. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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party.231 Although consistency and efficiency in patent claim
interpretation are important, no court has held that these
concerns are more important than fairness. 232 Accordingly, the
court has discretion not to apply collateral estoppel even if all
of the elements are met.2 33 Without a final judgment on
validity or infringement, it would be unfair to apply collateral
estoppel to the claim interpretation; therefore collateral
estoppel should not apply.
From the few cases that have addressed the issue, it is
unclear whether collateral estoppel will be applied to claim
interpretation if the parties settle before the final judgment.
Pre- and post-Markman precedent indicates that the
Kollmorgen court's refusal to apply collateral estoppel in this
fact situation is correct. There is no reason to carve out an
exception to the finality requirement of collateral estoppel for
claim interpretation, and until either the Federal Circuit or the
Supreme Court holds otherwise, collateral estoppel should not
apply to claim interpretation absent a final judgment on
infringement or validity.
B. THE DETERMINATION OF THE ISSuE Is NOT ESSENTIAL TO THE FINAL
JUDGMENT IF A PARTY LOSES ON CLAIM CONSTRUCnON BUT WINS ON
INFRINGEMENT
A party that loses on claim construction, for example, by
obtaining a narrower-than-urged claim limitation, but wins on
infringement has no motivation to appeal the claim
construction. In fact, that party may not be able to appeal the
claim construction.234 The Federal Circuit will only hear
appeals on claim construction decisions in which the party
concludes its case is irreparably harmed by the lower court's
231. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
232. See In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1467-68 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that
issue preclusion is based on the principle of fairness and that "under certain
circumstances, where all of the requirements of issue preclusion have been
met, the doctrine will not be applied"); see also cases cited supra note 63. The
Court has not extended preclusion against a party that was not involved in the
prior litigation, although it would increase consistency and efficiency. See
Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 327 n.7; Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); see also James R. Pielemeier, Due
Process Limitations on the Application of Collateral Estoppel Against
Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U. L. REV. 383, 425-31 (1983); supra note
56.
233. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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claim interpretation, and it is clear that a party that wins on
the final judgment will not be able to appeal the claim
interpretation.235  As one scholar noted, "[a]s a general
proposition of law, it makes sense for the Federal Circuit to
preclude winning parties from appealing adversely decided
issues and to refrain from issuing advisory opinions."236 Before
Markman, the Federal Circuit held that in the context of claim
interpretation, "judicial statements regarding the scope of
patent claims are entitled to collateral estoppel effect in a
subsequent infringement suit only to the extent that
determination of scope was essential to a final judgment on the
question of validity or infringement. 2 37 If a party loses on
claim construction but wins on infringement, that party should
not be collaterally estopped from arguing the claim language in
a later trial.
Two pre-Markman cases, Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser
American Corp.238 and A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,239 are
central to the analysis of the preclusive effect of a claim
interpretation when a party loses on claim construction but
wins on infringement. In Jackson Jordan, the Federal Circuit
held that collateral estoppel does not apply to claim
interpretation if the claim interpretation was not the reason for
the loss in the first case.240 The Federal Circuit noted that
estoppel could not apply to claim interpretation if a party loses
on claim interpretation but wins on infringement. 241 Jackson
Jordan supports the proposition that a party that loses on
claim interpretation but wins on infringement is not
collaterally estopped from arguing the claim language again in
a later trial.
In A.B. Dick, the Federal Circuit held that in order to apply
collateral estoppel to claim interpretation, the interpretation
235. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
236. Nard, supra note 46, at 385.
237. A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
see also Freeman, 30 F.3d at 1466 ("To apply issue preclusion to a claim
interpretation issue decided in a prior infringement adjudication, 'the
interpretation of the claim had to be the reason for the loss [in the prior case]
on the issue of infringement.") (alteration in original) (quoting Jackson
Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); supra
note 112.
238. 747 F.2d 1567.
239. 713 F.2d 700.
240. Jackson Jordan, 747 F.2d at 1577-78.
241. Id.
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must have been essential to the final judgment.242 The court
held that judicial statements regarding the scope of a patent
claim were hypothetical "except in the context of
infringement."243 Like Jackson Jordan, A.B. Dick supports the
proposition that a party that loses on claim interpretation but
wins on infringement should not be collaterally estopped from
arguing the claim language again in a later trial.
The TM Patents court questioned whether Jackson Jordan
and A.B. Dick remain good law in light of the Markman
decision.244 Specifically, TM Patents questioned whether the
proposition that the cases stood for, "collateral estoppel effects
from claim construction should be narrowly limited to matters
that were essential to a judgment," is still good law.245 The
problem with this suggestion is that Markman did not overrule
Federal Circuit precedent on collateral estoppel. Since the
Markman decision, the Federal Circuit has made clear that
Markman solely addresses the role of judge and jury at the trial
level.246 The Markman Court stated that its decision would
"promote" certainty through the use of preclusion, though the
Court noted the decision would "not guarantee" certainty.247 As
stated earlier, this passage does not support overruling pre-
Markman Federal Circuit case law on collateral estoppel. 248
That the Court noted the decision would not guarantee legal
certainty indicates the Court realized Markman rulings would
not be preclusive in all circumstances. Because the Court did
not give any direction as to when collateral estoppel should
apply, it is safe to presume pre-Markman Federal Circuit
precedent on collateral estoppel issues is still good law.
Markman does not explicitly or implicitly overrule Jackson
Jordan or A.B. Dick; nothing within either of the cases goes
against Markman, and both cases are still cited as good law.249
242. 713 F.2d at 704.
243. Id.
244. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 378 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); see supra note 122.
245. TMPatents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
246. See supra note 41.
247. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996); see
supra note 41.
248. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
249. Before issuing its decision, the Graco court specifically asked the
parties to examine Jackson Jordan and its applicability to collateral estoppel
of claim interpretation. Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Regalo Intl, LLC, 77
F. Supp. 2d 660, 662 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1999). After hearing both sides, and in
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Graco Children's Products, Inc. v. Regalo International,
LLC was the first post-Markman case to determine the
collateral estoppel effect of claim interpretation if a party loses
on claim construction, but wins on infringement. 250 The court
held that a party that lost on claim interpretation but won on
infringement was not estopped from arguing the claim
interpretation in a later trial.251  The court applied pre-
Markman decisions on collateral estoppel, including Jackson
Jordan and A-B. Dick, and found that the reasoning used in the
cases applied even after Markman.252 The court also rejected
the reasoning in TM Patents, noting that Markman did not
overrule the Federal Circuit cases dealing with collateral
estoppel. 253
Critics have suggested that the plaintiff in Graco could
have appealed the claim interpretation. 254 This suggestion is
without merit because the Federal Circuit routinely refuses to
hear appeals on claim interpretation. 255 Even if the district
court had certified the claim construction for appeal, the
plaintiff won on infringement and had no motivation to appeal.
It is well established that if a party loses on one issue but wins
the final judgment, the party is not estopped from rearguing
the issue in a later appeal.25 6 This rule does not change merely
because the party settles after trial.
Some critics have also argued that claim interpretation is
always essential to the final judgment, whether the patentee
wins or loses. 257 While it is technically true that the claim
spite of the TM Patents decision, the court declared that Jackson Jordan is
still good law. Id. at 663-65.
Kollmorgen, Abbott, and Graco all cite A.B. Dick as good law. See
Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (W.D. Va.
2001); Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667, 669-70 (N.D. IMl. 2000);
Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
250. 77 F. Supp. 2d 660; see supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
251. Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664; supra note 152 and accompanying text.
252. See Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664; supra note 154.
253. See Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664; supra note 154.
254. See Van Over, supra note 80, at 1158 ("While the patent holder did not
expressly appeal the issue of claim construction, it could have.").
255. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
256. See sources cited supra note 145.
257. See Van Over, supra note 80, at 1160 ("The Graco Court also found
that the Markman ruling in the first case was not essential to the final
judgment in that case because the patent holder prevailed. This is wrong as a
matter of law. Claim construction is always essential to final judgment of
infringement, no matter whether the patent holder loses or prevails.").
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construction is necessary whether the patentee prevails or
loses, this argument does not give appropriate weight to the
Federal Circuit precedent:
[A] party can be said to have "lost" if it urged a broad scope of the
claim, and the court upheld validity on a narrower interpretation.
However, if a claim is held valid and infringed on a narrower than
necessary basis, the patent owner cannot appeal. Thus, under the
first exception to issue preclusion... [a party cannot] invoke an
estoppel against [another party] since [the latter] won on both
validity and infringement.
25 8
The law is clear: If a party loses on an issue, but wins the
final judgment, that issue does not have collateral estoppel
effect, even if the issue on which the party lost received
consideration in determining the final judgment.
CONCLUSION
Collateral estoppel should not be applied if the required
elements are not met. Markman did not overrule past
precedent on collateral estoppel, and the required elements are
not met if the claim interpretation is not essential to the final
judgment on infringement or validity. Of the two tests for
finality articulated by district courts, the Kollmorgen test for
finality is consistent with both pre- and post-Markman
precedent, and is superior to the test posed by the TM Patents
court. Although the Federal Circuit has not yet ruled on the
collateral estoppel effect of claim interpretation if the parties
settle before trial or if a party loses on its claim construction
but wins on infringement, policy and precedent demand that
collateral estoppel should not be used in either circumstance.
258. Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1577-78
(Fed. Cir. 1984); see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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